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Abstract
Interrogating the notion of the differend, taken from Jean-Franҫois Lyotard’s book of the
same name, in which a wrong occurs along with the impossibility of its representation as
a wrong, this thesis attempts to rearticulate the relationship between the distant and
heterogeneous theories dealing with a supposedly common subject matter: namely, the
sublime. The sublime as it is taken up in the rhetorical pedagogy of Longinus, the
transcendental aesthetic of Immanuel Kant, and the postmodern theory of Jean-Franҫois
Lyotard refuses to yield a shared dimension that could bind together these major
moments of thought. There are sublimes, it seems, rather than a single sublime. Against
this, I contend that the thought of these three figures all constitute a site for a differend
involving that which is both singular and irreducible in its happening here and now and
therefore always escapes representation: the event of presentation as such.
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Preface
I
Beneath the humorous and self-deprecating tone of the preface to Jean-François
Lyotard’s The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, his little “reading dossier” with which one
can “’talk about the book’ without having read it,”1 and despite the perhaps ironic use of
taxonomic divisions to hang, draw, and quarter his own work—as it can be nothing other
than a traitor to his own cause—there remains a grave syncopation that interrupts the
playful résumé, as when Lyotard plainly tells us: “the time has come to philosophize.”2
For Lyotard, philosophy is to be held apart from “theory” with its accompanying
“weariness” and “miserable slackening,”3 yet he never elaborates on this distinction,
leaving it as a somewhat enigmatic pairing. To better understand this distinction Lyotard
makes between philosophy and theory, perhaps an elementary and slightly pedantic
etymological exercise is in order: theory, coming from Greek theōréō (to look at, to view)
and theōrós (spectator), connotes the visionary, the hundred-eyed Argus Panoptes that
sees all and misses nothing; while philosophy, as is well known, is enamoured with its
beloved (phílos) wisdom (sophía). But while love can continue in the face of a certain
absence of the beloved through a lingering emotion or feeling (in fact, it often runs
smoother this way), vision is rendered impotent when there is nothing to be seen. For this

1

Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van den Abbeele
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), xiv.
2

Ibid, xiii.
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Ibid.
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reason, Lyotard’s The Differend could be read as a love-letter to that which cannot be
represented but only felt: the state of the differend.
As a felt blankness or vacuity, the differend is inextricably bound to a certain
sense of anticipation or expectation. Lyotard writes: “The differend is the unstable state
and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases
cannot yet be.”4 Lyotard’s use of “must” in this instance should be noted. It is not the
must of necessity but rather the must of obligation, and therefore the phrasing of the
differend is not a marginal endeavor within philosophy but rather constitutes its properly
ethical dimension. It is philosophy at its most just. This is because “in the differend,
something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to
be put into phrases right away.”5 Yet, we must also linger over Lyotard’s use of the word
“wrong” in relation to the differend. In contradistinction to what Lyotard calls a
“damage,”—that is, a harm, impairment, or disavowal that, through its representation,
entails the possibility of restitution—a wrong is:
a damage [dommage] accompanied by the loss of the means to prove the
damage. This is the case if the victim is deprived of life, or of all his or her
liberties, or of the freedom to make his or her ideas or opinions public, or
simply of the right to testify to the damage, or even more simply if the
testifying phrase is itself deprived of authority (Nos. 24-27). In all of these
cases, to the privation constituted by the damage there is added the

4

Ibid, 13.

5

Ibid.
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impossibility of bringing it to the knowledge of others, and in particular to
the knowledge of a tribunal.6
Despite the acknowledged anthropomorphism of the legalistic term employed here,
Lyotard maintains that in facing the “wrong” of the differend, a task not merely
belonging to philosophy but one shared by all attempts at just thinking in general, is both
“to recognize what remains to be phrased” and “to institute idioms which do not yet
exist.”7 Feeling that something remains to be said, the philosopher must attempt to phrase
the differend despite its seeming impossibility to thought.
Returning to the use of “must,” both in my own and Lyotard’s formulation of the
task of philosophy, it must be repeated that this word signals here not a necessity but an
obligation, a confusion that Lyotard quite rightly warns us to be aware of. Yet the
distance between these is precisely where the differend finds its place of emergence.
Lyotard writes: “First of all, it is necessary to link onto a phrase that happens, there is no
possibility of not linking onto it. Second, to link is necessary; how to link is contingent.”8
In any given instance of a phrasing, because of the diachronic flow of time, another
phrase must necessary follow, even if what follows is a silence (a silence can be a refusal,
an incapability, an astonishment and itself will be subsequently followed—or “linked”
onto—by a phrase which must necessarily follow: “Did you hear what I said?”; “He must
be stupid”; etc.). However, the rules which govern the movement from phrase to phrase
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Ibid, 5.
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Ibid, 13.

8

Ibid, 29.
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are open to variation. It is in this distance between the necessary and the contingent that
what Lyotard calls “genres of discourse” make themselves apparent and give rise to states
of the differend. Neither wholly belonging to the desires of particular interlocutors nor to
an autonomous language as such, each genre of discourse carries within it a singular telos
or finality that determines certain tendencies or inclinations in the concatenation of
phrases. Giving an example, Lyotard writes: “Genres of discourse determine stakes, they
submit phrases from different regimens to a single finality: the question, the example, the
argument, the narration, the exclamation are in forensic rhetoric the heterogeneous means
of persuading.”9 Because the finality that belongs to a genre of discourse is incompatible
and in competition with those of every other genre, differends arise because the rules
governing the tendency of phrasing belonging to one must necessarily be chosen over
another, “because only one of them can happen (be ‘actualized’) at a time.”10
II
Yet the conflict between competing genres of discourse is only one type (if one
wants to use such a word) of differend, albeit one that dominates the book bearing its
name. But as Rodolphe Gasché is apt to point out, the lack of a clear differentiation
between different types of the differend by Lyotard constitutes an unresolved problem.11
Let us take up an instance of the differend that holds a prominent place within the text,

9

Ibid.
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11

Ibid.

Rodolphe Gasché, “Saving the Honor of Thinking,” in Minima Memoria: In the Wake of Jean-François
Lyotard, ed. Claire Nouvet, Zrinka Stahuljak, and Kent Still (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007):
37.
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one which Lyotard returns to time and time again: the Holocaust. In the conflict which
arises between competing heterogeneous genres of discourse and their respective
finalities, a differend emerges between the testimony of the victim (whether it is through
silence or impassioned speech) and the logic of the Holocaust denier. Each follows a
different set of rules regarding the object or event being discussed—that is, each is
phrased within a different genre of discourse—and only one of those may be deemed
legitimate and guide subsequent phrase instances. But the event of the Holocaust also
exemplifies another type of differend. In an essay on Lyotard and the differend, Jacob
Rogozinski identifies “two figures of the wrong, two versions of silence, two modes of
necessity.”12 The first belongs to the differend discussed above, one that is forced by the
necessity of phrasing and the arbitrary selection of one genre’s tendency of phrasing over
another: “ . . . the inevitable discarding of the possible for the real, the impossibility of
‘saying everything.’”13 The second intimates the cessation of linkage, “[pleading] in the
name of uniqueness, of a power to phrase each time unique and threatened with
interruption . . . when the very possibility of linkage is menaced.”14 For Rogozinski, this
second type of differend is exemplified by nothing other than the Holocaust. But the
Holocaust can stand in for yet another differend—another wrong—that, while
acknowledged and discussed by Lyotard, is relegated to a minor position within the text.
What is striking about this instance of the differend is that it does not reside so much
between the different genres of discourse but rather resides at the heart of every genre of
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Jacob Rogozinski, “Lyotard: Differend, Presence,” L’esprit créateur 31, no. 1 (1991): 110.
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discourse, one that perhaps even calls for the transition from one genre to another. While
Rogozinski emphasizes the intrusive aspect of the second type of differend,
characterizing it as an “interruption,” this third differend is much more obscure precisely
because it is pervasive and ubiquitous. Indeed, it would perhaps be more accurate to say
that this differend evades notions of beginning and ending—and therefore interruption.
This is the differend of the event of presentation as such.
In order to understand this type of differend, we must first return to a component
of Lyotard’s thinking that has been thus far left unexplained: the phrase. For Lyotard, the
phrase appears to be the minimal unit of thought constituting what could be described as
a First Philosophy of Phrasing (Lyotard notes that “to doubt” that one phrases is
nevertheless a phrase along with a refusal to phrase: there is no “non-phrase”). Each
phrase belongs to a particular “phrase regimen” which includes the syntactic and
grammatical rules that govern its construction, regimens such as the denotative, the
ostensive, the interrogative, etc. However, it should be noted that, despite the lexicon
used to describe the phrase and the act of phrasing, the phrase neither belongs exclusively
to language—either written or spoken—as it is commonly understood nor does it belong
to humans as their properly defining feature: “A wink, a shrugging of the shoulder, a
tapping of the foot, a fleeting blush, or an attack of tachycardia can be phrases. –And the
wagging of a dog’s tail, the perked ears of a cat? –And a tiny speck to the West rising
upon the horizon of the sea?”15 What all phrases share is that each one entails what

15

Lyotard, The Differend, 70.

7

Lyotard calls a “universe”—that is, the four instances of addressor, addressee, a referent,
and a sense—or, better still, that each phrase presents a universe.
Nonetheless, there are limitations to the presentation of a phrase. What escapes
the presentation of any phrase, no matter its regimen, is the presentation of its own
presentation: in other words, the event of presentation as such. If one were to simplify,
the presentation of a phrase would appear to be the veritable being of the phrase as it
happens or occurs. Lyotard, however, objects to this denomination: “Could the
presentation entailed by a phrase be called Being? But it is one presentation, or what in a
phrase-case is the case. Being would be a case, an occurrence, the ‘fact’ that it happens to
‘fall,’ that is ‘comes running’ (Fall, occurrence). Not Being, but one being, one time.”16
Presentation is not the general being of a phrase but is rather the irreducible singularity
and heterogeneity of an event that occurs at this specific instant and no other. The event
of presentation can itself be presented but only through a later phrase that follows it and
makes of the first an instance of its universe, such as a referent, and therefore the
irreducible singularity of the event of presentation as such is nullified; its hic et nunc—or
here and now—is irretrievably lost. In this way, the event of presentation as such
becomes a locus for the differend: not only is the irreducible hic et nunc of presentation
as such wronged by the subsequent phrase that necessarily drains the event of its presence
by virtue of coming after but the initial phrase also has no recourse to presenting the
event of presentation through its own means. It becomes the unpresentable.
III

16

Ibid.

8

As that which eludes re-presentation and brings us to the limits of thought and
understanding, the event of presentation parallels another notion bearing similar traits: the
sublime. Derived from the latin sublimis as that which brings us up to (sub-) the threshold
(limen) of things, the sublime bears the connotations of blockage, difficulty, even
impossibility. Yet, if the differend of presentation as such—that is, that a phrase cannot
present its own event of unfolding in the here and now—is a necessary part of all
phrasing, then the question of why we make recourse to the slightly withered concept of
the sublime remains to be answered. Is the sublime a type of phrase regimen, a way of
speaking in which presentation as such can emerge? Or rather is the sublime a genre of
discourse with a finality to phrase that which cannot be phrased: a telos of presenting the
event of presentation as such? Perhaps, but if this is the case, then as a genre of discourse
it holds no particular privilege regarding the other genres. As Lyotard continually
stresses, we lack a universal rule to preside over the others and to validate the privileging
of one genre over another. The sublime, then, is not a genre of genres. Even to attempt to
compile the range of thought and art suspended under the heading of the sublime into a
homogeneous and consistent field would appear somewhat suspect. Indeed, the
sublime—in the singular—is something of a misnomer; perhaps it would be more
accurate to say the sublimes: “because the singular calls forth the plural (as the plural
does the singular) and because the singular and the plural are together already the
plural.”17

17

Ibid, xii.

9

Nevertheless, there does seem to be a common strand that runs through the work
of the three figures I have assembled in these pages: Longinus, Immanuel Kant, and JeanFrançois Lyotard. What they offer us is what I would like to call the thought of the
sublime or, perhaps more sharply, sublime thought. Bracketing the varied definitions and
attributes ascribed to the concept of the sublime by these individuals themselves, we can
use the sublime to denominate a site or locus where the differend of presentation as such
comes to the fore, and this word can then be used to describe the very thought of those
who think at the limits. Whether rendering hýpsous, or the “high,” of rhetorical language
teachable through a grounding in phantasia as in Longinus, enacting a temporal
displacement of the futural Ideas of reason onto the formless instant of the present as in
Kant, or obliging thought through the phrasing of the philosophical interrogative as in
Lyotard, the hic et nunc of presentation has a undeniable presence within the work of
these three figures. In all cases, they succumb to the problems associated with the
differend of presentation as such. As it is a moment of irreducible singularity, the event of
presentation comes to the surface only to be re-submerged through an inability of all
thought, from its roots given to us in antiquity to our contemporary moment, to do justice
to presentation as such. Sublime thought signifies a certain failure, the ruination of
thought, and this thesis is a surveying of those crumbled structures.
However, the sublime thought is not merely thought’s tomb but is also
paradoxically its bower of vitality. If the thought of the sublime remains
contemporaneous and relevant to us now, it is only through this tension residing within it,
a tension resulting from another force that presses against its failure. The thought of
Longinus, Kant, and Lyotard all share moments of breaching in which they seemingly

10

offer manners, as opposed to methods, of approaching the event of presentation as such.
Giving us new ways of remembering, new ways to orientate our thought, and new ways
to fabulate, these three moments of sublime thought bring thinking in proximity to that
which is utterly alien to it. This paradox of the failure and the success of thought
regarding the event of presentation is what makes them neither failures nor successes but
rather aporias. As aporetic moments of thought, they cannot be said to resolve the
differend of presentation as such by in fact presenting it. But what can be affirmed is that,
in their aporetic and irresolvable state, they can at least testify to it, to show that there is
something that remains to be thought. For this reason, sublime thought, despite the
seeming vacuity of the adjective, is essential to the task of thinking the differend, a task
that remains the only way to “save the honor of thinking.”18

18

Ibid.
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Chapter 1
I
The genre of discourse known as rhetoric is marked by an idiosyncratic
confrontation of phrases, an agonistic or dialogic tort-retort unfolding19—or, to use
Lyotard’s lexicon, linking—emphasizing the interplay and interchange of addressor and
addressee. Yet, as we noted in the introduction, genres of discourse are identified by the
singular finality or goal that determines this unfolding of phrases, the tendency of one
phrase type to be followed by another, so that this finality can be accomplished. For the
rhetorical genre of discourse, as it was known in Classical Greek tradition, the finality
that satisfies the unfolding of phrases and allows the apposite succession of other genres
of discourse is nothing other than persuasion, and only a signal of victory can herald the
advent of this finality. The phrasing of this proclamation can be varied and manifold: in
an opponent’s admittance of defeat (whether explicit or implied through his or her
silence), in the formal verdict of a judging party, or in the thunderous reaction of
spectators. But whether crowned with the laurel leaf or evicted from the podium, both
outcomes are the product of the same activity: that of judgment (“I am persuaded: your
opening remarks were sound and your argument was well formed”; “I am unconvinced:
you begged the question and broke the rule of non-contradiction”). With this passing of
judgment, the unfolding of phrases can then transition into other genres of discourse, or

19

Tort and retort not in the sense of righting a wrong but in the sense of a twisting and re-twisting (or
twisting further); torquēre.

12

one can re-enter the rhetorical genre if the judgment itself becomes the referent of further
contestation.
The passing of judgment, however, not only takes place in the evaluation of a
prior phrase or set of phrases but also takes place in the selection of phrases by the
interlocutors themselves. Yet, for all their intertwining, the relationship between rhetoric
and judgment remains equivocal. As Aristotle famously writes in his treatise on the topic,
“rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of
persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. That is why we say that as an art its rules
are not applied to any particular definite class of things.”20 A genre of discourse that
twists and retwists written and spoken language through a mastery of its protean
malleability, rhetoric appears to be the space not in which phrases undergo judgment but
in which phrases evade judgment. Operating within and alongside other genres of
discourse, rhetoric infiltrates at the levels of syntax, paratax, and lexis without necessarily
interfering with their specific finalities, weaving in and out with minimal disruption.
From this, it appears that rhetoric solves the state of the differend caused by the finitude
of selection discussed above, the differend of either/or: either this phrase or that phrase,
but not both. Instead, Greek rhetoric disposes of the either/or for a hidden and,
approaching Paul de Man’s later formulation of rhetoric as an undecidable instance which
“suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration.”21
Nevertheless, while it appears as a meta-tactic that is applicable to “any subject

20

Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926): 1.2.1.

21

Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (October 1973): 29-30.

13

whatever,” rhetoric continues to be bound to the telos of persuasion, and judgment is still
required in the selection and validation of which phrase is “best suited” to sway one’s
opinion, despite its clandestine importation of foreign meaning. The Aristotelian tradition
of rhetoric nourishes us with a poisoned well in which Lyotard’s notion of the differend is
only reaffirmed and reproduced.
Despite its enduring influence, the Aristotelian tradition does not stand monolithic
in the history of rhetoric. Other, more obscure figures can be apprehended in the shadowy
field of the Greek rhetorical tradition, and one such figure gives us a rhetoric that
paradoxically goes beyond rhetoric itself, as least in its Aristotelian guise: Longinus and
the origins of the sublime. This first extant writing on the sublime comes from a
relatively obscure and, at least in our contemporary moment, little-read rhetorical treatise
written anywhere from the first to the third century of the common era entitled Perī
Hýpsous, or, as it is more commonly known, On the Sublime. While the treatise has been
praised as a rhetorical masterpiece on its own (Alexander Pope’s famous estimation of
Longinus, “Whose own Example strengthens all his Laws, / And Is himself that great
Sublime he Draws”22), its primary focus is on teaching the art of rhetoric—the
pedagogical strain within the rhetorical tradition. Its pedagogical value, however, is
“extremely problematic,”23 a fact supported by the series of lacunae that surround the
work. Written at the request of a friend, Terentian, the treatise often assumes the intimacy
and elliptical character of the epistolary form. Moreover, the treatise was also partially

22

Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, ed. Maynard Mack (New Heven: Yale University Press, 1951), lines
678-9.
23

Philip Shaw, The Sublime (New York: Routledge, 2006), 12.
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written in response to an earlier work by a person named Caecilius, which is now lost.
Wanting to supplement, and not repeat, the work of Caecilius, Longinus often leaves
much unexplained and undefined. Even the sublime itself, hýpsous or “the high,” merely
described as an elevated state of language, remains largely distant from understanding,
like a nimbus cloud floating “high” above us.
The certain aloofness and obscurity that surrounds the “high,” rather than
indicating a certain carelessness on the part of Longinus, should perhaps be seen as a sign
of difficulty or conflict within the treatise. Despite any echoes of the Aristotelian tradition
that persist in his writing, Longinus is quick to stress that it is irreducibly different from
its counter-part, writing in the first chapter of the treatise: “For the effect of genius is not
to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. Invariably what
inspires wonder, with its power of amazing us, always prevails over what is merely
convincing and pleasing.”24 The Longinian sublime, then, offers a mode of rhetoric that
explicitly rejects the Aristotelian view that a perfected use of language entails a
“convincing” or persuasive outcome. As Ned O’Gorman argues, this unshackling from
“the tradition of character and persuasion” allows rhetoric to enter a state of “autonomy”
for the first time.25 I would amend O’Gorman’s declaration slightly so that the end
securing the rhetoric of the sublime becomes not absent but rather indeterminate. What is
being dismissed in Longinus’ treatise is rhetoric’s traditional goal, “to persuade,” which

24

Longinus, “On the Sublime,” trans. W.H. Fyfe, Poetics, On the Sublime, On Style (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995), 1.4.
25

Ned O’Gorman, “Longinus’s Sublime Rhetoric, or How Rhetoric Came into its Own,” Rhetoric Society
Quarterly 34.2 (2004): 75.
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is replaced by the ability of language “to transport”[ekstasis].26 Language no longer has
an embedded terminus but is now propelled by an indeterminate agitation, a swelling and
heaving of language without harbor or lighthouse in sight: movement as opposed to
destination. But perhaps more than movement, the Longinian sublime strives towards a
certain immediacy, a presence that is not in need of any persuasion to validate it. If the
thought of Longinus is indeed sublime thought, it is because the ékstasis of the Longinian
sublime unknowingly strives towards the event of presentation as such.
The hic et nunc—the here and now—of presentation is irreducible and
incommensurable to every genre of discourse, including the twinned genres of rhetoric
and pedagogy that characterize Longinus’ treatise. Longinus writes to teach us lessons, to
teach us how to achieve the immediacy of “high” language, to press towards the event of
presentation as such, but to do so the enigmatic process of transport, or ekstasis, must be
circumscribed by comprehension and understanding. In the conflict that arises between
the pedagogical impetus to unveil and illuminate and the occulted character of
presentation as such, the differend of presentation becomes activated. Yet, for the
pedagogical genre of discourse to fulfill its finality or goal, the event of presentation must
be presented, exhibited, examined. But as we have mentioned already in the preface, the
differend of presentation as such belongs to an impossibility or limitation inherent within
the act of presentation itself. As Lyotard argues, every phrase “entails” a presentation.
That is, every event that is capable of bearing significance gives us four necessary
instances of an addressor, an addressee, a sense, and a referent (“Get up!”: a parent gives

26

Longinus, 1.4.
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their child a command to change their current position or state; a comet streaks across the
sky: something or someone—God?—signals to a group of people—a nation, a sect?—the
spiritual or moral state of that group and that this state is one of sickness), but this event
of presentation, the advent of the irreducibly singular occurrence of the phrase, can never
be known as such because presentation cannot present itself simultaneously with the
presentation of its instances. Engaging in a moment of sophistry, Lyotard elucidates this
point: “What is not presented is not. The presentation entailed by a phrase is not
presented, it is not. Or: Being is not. One could say that when an entailed presentation is
presented, it is not an entailed but a situated presentation. Or: Being grasped as an
existent is non-Being.”27 The presentation of the phrase, then, can only be known after it
has occurred by way of a later phrase that comes after, retroactively determining it as
“presented presentation.”28 It is in the distance between an “entailed presentation” and a
“situated presentation” that the differend arises because the irreducible hic et nunc of
presentation as such is missed. Not only missed, however, but also transformed as it is
situated. In this moment of Longinus’ pedagogical situated presentation, presentation as
such, the “high,” must become something other than what it is: it must become an image,
a sight, a vision before the eyes. The teaching image that haunts the word: phantasia.
II
Casting shadows in the texts of both Plato and Aristotle, phantasia is one of the
spectres of Greek thought. And for this reason, it is not surprising that it also finds its

27

Lyotard, The Differend, 77.

28

Ibid, 71.
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way into many texts within the rhetorical tradition, such as those of Dionysius of
Halicarnassus and, of course, Longinus. The word phantasia carries a strong association
with the visual field, belonging to a family of Greek words including phantāzomai and
phainō, which circulate around events of appearing, unveiling, or showing, and because
of this, it is a word that provokes a deep suspicion towards its relation to the true, or lack
thereof. A will-o’-the-wisp within works of Plato such as his Republic, Sophist, and
Theaetetus, phantasia often appears in shifting relations to alētheia or doxa. What
remains fairly constant, however, is that “Plato regards images and appearances, and any
part of the mind that deals with them, as liable to produce error and illusion.”29 In
contradistinction to its negative Platonic associations, on the other hand, phantasia can
also be employed to denote the integral relation between thought and the world around us
via visualization, as evidenced by Aristotle’s On the Soul, Rhetoric, and On Memory. It is
this latter Aristotelian usage of phantasia that Longinus invokes in his attempt to present
the immediate and irreducible event of presentation as such and situate it within his
pedagogical treatise.
In order to more fully understand the implications of Longinus’ presentation
through the inheritance of phantasia, however, we must first disinter Aristotle’s
employment of the word and his understanding of visualization in general and bring it
before the mind’s eye, so to speak. Aristotle’s main treatment of phantasia is found in the
third chapter of Book Three of his On the Soul. While explicating the dynameis—or, as
they are commonly translated, faculties of the soul—Aristotle attempts to delineate the

29

Anne Sheppard, The Poetics of Phantasia: Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics (New York: Bloomsbury,
2014), 5-6.
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specific capabilities of every living entity and culminates with the supposedly
unparalleled faculties of human beings. Here, phantasia appears as a faculty of the soul
and is traditionally translated as “imagination”—rather than a more literal “image” or
“appearance”—and seems to occupy a position between sense perception and rational
thought: “For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking,
though it is not found without sensation, or judgment without it.”30 As “that in virtue of
which an image arises for us,”31 phantasia is still strongly associated with images, but the
emphasis is somewhat different. As Anne Sheppard comments: “For Aristotle phantasia
remains closely linked to ‘what appears’ and is the power to deal with appearances rather
than those appearances themselves.”32 Phantasia, then, is not itself a spectral image but is
rather a congenial faculty of the human soul that mediates between sense perceptions and
rational thought through the production of images. In this role as mediator, phantasia
holds an eminently important position regarding thinking in general, for Aristotle stresses
that “the soul never thinks without an image”33 and elsewhere remarks that without
phantasia “intellectual activity is impossible.”34 With this centrality of the phantasmal
image, the edges of seeing and thinking begin to overlap.
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While phantasia and its production of images are integral to the occurrence of
thought, the position of phantasia as a mediating faculty places it at the very heart of
what prevents immediacy. Yet immediacy does seem possible for Aristotle but only in
the use of visualization in artistic practice, and he uses an alternate lexicon to designate
this immediacy. In his Poetics, Aristotle dictates to the aspiring playwright: “One should
construct plots, and work them out in diction, with the material as much as possible in the
mind’s eye. In this way, by seeing things most vividly, as if present at the actual events,
one will discover what is apposite and not miss contradictions.”35 The tragedians’ efforts
to bring forth the most intelligible and affective work of art is largely dependent on the
activity of visualization, an activity that bears an unmistakable sense of immediacy as if
the playwright were “present at the actual events.” Paralleling the activity of the
playwright, Aristotle’s Rhetoric indicates a similar aspect of visualization on the part of
the spectators as well: “And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand .
. . it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic
action generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it
before our eyes as either future or past.”36 What connects these two excerpts—
specifically the “mind’s eye” of the first and “before our eyes” of the second—is a shared
phrasing in Greek: pro ommatōn or a bringing-before-the-eyes. Sheppard convincingly
argues that due to the frequency with which it appears and the consistency with which it
is applied, pro ommatōn operates for Aristotle “almost as a technical term for
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visualization.”37 Because both the creator and the audience engage in the activity of pro
ommatōn, the shared visualization creates a sense of immediacy despite the sinews of
language that are suspended between them. The image of the artist touches the image of
the audience, ignorant of the distance between them.
With these two aspects of Aristotelian thought in place, the mediating activity of
phantasia necessary for thought and the seemingly immediate presence of pro ommatōn,
we can now return to Longinus and the rhetoric of the sublime. Facing the irreducible hic
et nunc of presentation as such, the pedagogical goal of Longinus’ treatise founders on its
necessary belatedness. Yet, Longinus makes a novel manoeuver to overcome this
impasse and welds Aristotle’s phantasia together with pro ommatōn. In an early passage
from his treatise, Longinus writes:
Weight, grandeur, and urgency in writing are very largely produced, dear
young friend, by the use of ‘visualizations’ (phantasiai). That at least is
what I call them; others call them ‘image productions.’ For the term
phantasia is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind from any
source and engenders speech [logos], but the word has now come to be
used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, you
seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your
audience.38
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Here, Longinus delineates two potential meanings of phantasia that can be mapped onto
Aristotle’s treatment of images and visualization discussed above. One allows speech,
reason and discursive thought to come forth and enables them to be exchanged or
communicated. In other words, it also allows something to be taught, to enter the field of
pedagogy. The other, meanwhile, belongs to the realm of visualization in the addressor
and addressee, carrying with it an implied sense of immediacy. Rather than explicitly
choose which definition will be mobilized in his treatise, Longinus leaves the role of
phantasia ambiguously unresolved. Yet, his pedagogical goal to teach how to reach the
heights of language, the event of presentation as such, necessitates that he paradoxically
keep the mediate and the immediate together. Longinus must transform the image into an
icon of thought.
This condensation of immediacy and the mediate in Longinus’ use of phantasia is
secured through careful shiftings throughout the text. The first can be perceived in the
placement of Longinus’ discussion of phantasia within the text. Although it is discussed
as if it were a rhetorical figure, the notion of phantasia arises during an explication of the
congenial sources of the sublime rather than along with the other typical rhetorical
figures, such as metaphor and amplification. Because its nature is left ambiguous, the
figurativity of phantasia is thrown into doubt altogether,39 and in separating phantasia
from the other figurative techniques, Longinus is able to posit phantasia as a ground from
which to launch his pedagogical goal to teach the techniques of presenting the event of
presentation as such. The figure that is not a figure, phantasia, is then charged with a
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pedagogical valence through its ability to “engender speech.” Longinus notes that unlike
the rhetoric of the elevated language and its use of logos, instrumental music does not
appeal to our dianoia—that is, our reason or reflective thought.40 Rather than being a
phrase that is incompatible with thinking, the elevated phrasing advocated by Longinus
must engage thought and therefore be able to be to enter the pedagogical genre of
discourse, “not as a mere imposition of mental force . . . but as a powerfully charged
arousal and heightening of other minds’ thoughts.”41 With the immediate yet mediating,
non-figural figure of phantasia, Longinus is able to present the event of presentation, but
as a vision, a landscape: ut pictura poesis.
In this appeal to phantasia and the primacy of the image—as the fountainhead of
rhetorical pedagogy—to teach one to phrase the highest, the grandest, the most distant in
language, Longinus makes the shift from the entailed presentation to a situated
presentation. Unable to teach that which will not allow itself to be taught, Longinus
forces the event of presentation as such to conform to the categories of visualization and
phantasia, but these categories can only give form to presentation as such by merely
simulating the hic et nunc of the event, by simulating its irreducible immediacy. Michel
Deguy finds this manoeuvre encapsulated in the image of hýpsous itself, the high:
The problematic of (re)ascension or ‘the origin’ schematizes or figures
itself in accordance with the image of the high, the return to the source, the
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(re)unification of the manifold . . . Unity, anteriority, and height—or
synthesis, a prioricity, and elevation—are held together, maintained as coconceivable, by the configuration which compares them reciprocally:
schematization by images.42
To call the treatise itself “on the high” is not only an intimation of its true object of study,
the presentation of presentation within the rhetorical genre of discourse, but is also a
prelude to Longinus’ pedagogical situating: the determination of presentation as such
within the realm of visualization and the image to unveil and render teachable its
nebulous, irreducible, and occulted aspects. There is a presentation of presentation that
happens, but as a situated presentation, one that always comes too late, the tyranny of the
image arises, becoming the image of the beginning of thought and the end of thought.
The situated presentation of phantasia allows contact between minds but disallows
contact between the mind and the event of presentation as such, and for this reason, we
share a commonality in our feeble recollection of the event of presentation. Despite being
called the “high”, the true phantasia of Longinus’ sublime thought is this image: a river.
And every word that passes from our lips is a drink from Lethe.
III
There is a certain kinship that allows the river Lethe to flow through the landscape
of phantasia. Despite the supposed enargeia (clarity) and panoptic hýpsous (height) of
the phantasmal images of elevated language, Longinus’ pedagogical presentation, his
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situated presentation of presentation as such, is susceptible to deterioration: images can
become obscure; lines and folds can create divisions in the otherwise integral and unified
composition; certain spots are worn away or crumbling so what was previously there can
no longer be identified. One can only say that there was something happening.43 Yet, this
process of deterioration is also apt in describing the work of Lethe upon the mind, as
memories likewise become worn, tattered, and ruined. But there exists more than a mere
likeness between the phantasia of Longinus’ treatise and the disappearance of memory;
rather, the two are inextricably bound to one another. While Longinus situates
presentation as such in the guise of an image or appearance, he can only do so after the
event of presentation, and so the ostensive and demonstrative thrust of rhetorical
pedagogy must struggle with the movement of time in its attempt to present what came
before. Longinus’ pedagogical moment then—and perhaps every pedagogical moment—
is a process of remembrance or recall in the face of forgetfulness.
Paradoxically, however, it is the very movement of recall—so essential to
Longinus’ pedagogical presentation of an originary phantasmal image—that constitutes
the oblivion and forgetfulness in the attempt to think the event of presentation as such.
The Lethic dimension of Longinus’ presentation arrives exactly at the moment that he
attempts to posit phantasia as the moment of presentation as such and which later
“engenders” speech and allows its own reconstitution. In this moment of pedagogical
presentation, the event of presentation is situated through a determination of its origins:
as the phantasmal image of thought. This presentation in Longinus’ pedagogical treatise,
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however, necessarily forgets certain presuppositions that are necessary for the positing of
an origin. Lyotard is instructive in this regard: writing on the seemingly universal
character of the phrase “I doubt” as the foundation or first moment of the Cartesian
Method, he notes that “to verify that I doubt or any other phrase presumed to be the first
in position is in fact there, one must at least presuppose the ordinal series of events, from
which the predicate first derives its sense. . . . it is succession itself which is already
presupposed.”44 In this way, the following positions in the ordinal series can, if not come
before, at least arrive simultaneously with the supposed origin of the series. Following
Lyotard’s line of argument, Longinus’ positing of phantasia as the event of presentation
similarly presupposes the co-arrival of the two terms of the series, phantasia and speech,
but must necessarily forget this tandem movement in his pedagogical presentation. The
same result would happen if we were to invert the series and place speech first in the
series, and as a result, we reach a moment of indetermination regarding the event of
presentation. The “high,” as presentation as such, is irreducible to either speech or image:
the most we can say is that it is both speech and image or—and this is more likely—that
it is neither speech nor image.
The forgetting of co-arrival in the ordinal series, or the paradoxical movement of
the second accompanying the first, sounds the distance between the pedagogical genre of
discourse and other genres of discourse. While all genres of discourse situate the
presentations of the phrases that come before them, the pedagogical genre of discourse
cannot function properly without such a gesture: situating presentations is a necessity for
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the genre in order for it to teach its rule or its “lesson.” This becomes clearer if we first
turn to another genre of discourse for the sake of contrast: philosophy. As Lyotard notes,
“philosophical discourse has as its rule to discover its rule: its a priori is what it has at
stake. It is a matter of formulating this rule, which can only be done at the end, if there is
an end.”45 The philosophical genre of discourse, as it should be properly understood
according to Lyotard, is a search, an adventure, a movement of discovery. Like the
pedagogical genre, the philosophical genre of discourse involves a strange warping of
succession: the beginning must only come at the end, the first is the last. However, in this
way they are somewhat like foils to one another. Pedagogical discourse must forego any
semblance of forward progression in favor of anamnesis: to recall and posit, if not the
origin, then at least what is prior. Teaching must precede discovery; one can only begin
anew by returning to what is already known. This is even so when, as in the case of
Longinus, one wishes to teach how to return to the irreducible event of presentation as
such.
But the lesson that Longinus wants to teach in his treatise, the phantasmal
foundation of presentation as such, is not the only one to be found in the text. There are
many: unfinished lessons, useless lessons, and even forgotten lessons. The latter are
signaled by a passage that perhaps inadvertently or accidentally renders the entirety of the
treatise suspect and is a lesson all the more integral for that fact. This lesson is what
Michel Deguy baptizes the “solar unity” of the sublime, a unity which unravels

45

Ibid, 60.

27

Longinus’ positing of the originary phantasmal image.46 Deguy, staring into the sun
itself, derives this lesson of Longinus from a well-known excerpt from the treatise.
Longinus writes:
So we find that a figure is always most effective when it conceals the very
fact of its being a figure. Sublimity and emotional intensity are a
wonderfully helpful antidote against the suspicion that accompanies the
use of figures. The artfulness of the trick is no longer obvious in its
brilliant setting of beauty and grandeur, and thus avoids all suspicion . . .
Much in the same way that dimmer lights vanish in the surrounding
radiance of the sun, so an all-embracing atmosphere of grandeur obscures
the rhetorical devices.47
In this instance, Longinus attempts to reconcile the distance between physis and techne,
but no complete return to an undivided state is possible. Instead, one can only ever
obscure the difference between the two, hide the one behind the other so that one merely
appears as what it is not. The lesson of this relation finds itself mirrored in Longinus’
own pedagogical presentation of the “high” discussed above: the phantasmal image as
situating presentation hides the very fact of its artifice through the shimmering of its
seemingly immediate intelligibility. What Longinus fails to point out, however, is that the
hidden techne can also be hidden from those who are using it. And a techne hidden from
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all is not hidden, properly speaking; rather it is forgotten, dropped into the river Lethe:
not a hidden but a forgotten art.
Teaching the art of the unteachable, however, requires this moment of oblivion; it
cannot be done otherwise. To present the unpresentable event of presentation for
edification and its eventual reconstitution must result in a forgetting of that presentation.
Its entailed presentation, its being as a singular occurrence, is replaced with a situated
presentation so that it can properly be the object of a lesson or a rule. Deguy posits that
the techne of synthesis undergirds the entirety of the Longinian sublime, “constituting a
second beginning, or rather a beginning after ‘the origin,”48 and this is exactly what also
undergirds Longinus’ pedagogical attempt: the attempted synthesis of an entailed
presentation and a situated presentation. But the attempt to bring the occurring and the
situating in as close a proximity as possible obscures the technical and situational
maneuvers of presenting presentation as such within the realm of visualization and
phantasia. This forgotten presentation allows one to teach the art of the “high,” to present
its rules and formulations, to create a second techne of rhetorical figures and schemas in
place of the effaced one that gave birth to them in the first place but at the price of
perpetuating the differend of presentation as such. It is in this way that the sublime
thought of Longinus constitutes what Deguy rightly calls a “lethal event” (Lethe).49
The mirroring that plays out between the hidden lesson of forgetting and the
pedagogical presentation of that sublime provokes a painful realization: the abyss at the
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heart of truth and knowledge. Much like the operation of metaphor, metonymy, and
anthropomorphism in the constitution of truth for Nietzsche, situated presentations are
repeated and reiterated until they are forgotten as situated. This is how the pedagogy of
the impossible becomes possible: through a continual misrecognition of the past for the
now. The irreducible hic et nunc of presentation as such is only available to us after it has
passed and has appeared within another presentation that is not, and cannot, be the same
as the first. And in this misrecognition comes the ever doubling of mis-presentations. In
presenting the past as the now, the current phrase in turn cannot present its own
happening which can only be caught by a further presentation, and so on and so forth. Yet
it is only this way that a teaching can happen. The abysmal relation of aletheia to Lethe
becomes acute: “There must be a swooning syncopation in the listener—in all listeners,
including the speaker—in order for the rhetorical moment to be identified with the
moment of natural perfection; a λανθάνεσθαι, or ‘over-looking,’ a λήθη, as the condition
for the utterance of the ‘truth.’”50 For presentation as such to be reconciled to thought and
to be an object of rhetorical study, it must be forgotten as an event. Forgetting comes first
in the series . . . but doesn’t the first presuppose that which comes after? From the neverending interplay of Mnemosyne and Lethe an echoing begins to issue from Longinus’
treatise: another lesson awaits us.
IV
In the face of the forgetfulness that accompanies a presented presentation or a
situated presentation, there is a certain futility that pervades the attempt to do justice to
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the irreducible singularity of the event of presentation as such and thereby to resolve the
state of the differend pertaining to it. Justice seemingly becomes an impossibility given
the temporal necessity of how presentation as such comes to be known only after the
presentation ceases to be an event of the here and now in the transition from an entailed
presentation to situated presentation. One can never arrest the loss of memory: forgetting
continually takes place in the process of presentation. For this reason, Longinus’
pedagogical treatise on the “high” will always be a book of lost memories, as the
phantasmal images he posits as its foundation can only appear through the loss of a
phrase’s own entailed presentation. Likewise, even in the situated presentation of the
“high” in terms of visualization, the irreducible singularity of that presentation is
similarly lost until another phrase comes to situate that presentation, ad infinitum. Phrases
are only ever too late. There is something titanic and mythic about this process: Sisyphus
rolling the boulder, Orobouros devouring its own tail, a never-ending opus or ergon.
Despite this pervasive and insidious form of repetition, there is also the sense that
in this continual falling into forgetting there is also a certain production or creation that
can come in the face of nothingness. Lyotard himself hints at such an economy: “The
presentation entailed by a phrase is forgotten by it, plunged into the river Lethe . . .
Another phrase pulls it back out and presents it, oblivious to the presentation that it itself
entails. Memory is doubled by oblivion. Metaphysics struggles against oblivion, but what
is whatever struggles for oblivion called?”51 The attempt at complete anamnesis is
impossible in that amnesia is its condition of possibility, but nevertheless the struggle
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against oblivion is the metaphysical—and pedagogical—endeavour, the attempt at total
recall or remembrance, to bring the forgotten into light. Lyotard suggests that there is an
alternative, however obscure it may be: to “struggle for oblivion.” This alternative should
not be mistaken for a nihilistic or iconoclastic call-to-arms, but rather should be
understood as a shift in emphasis. Here, a distinction in terms is necessary: to struggle for
oblivion is not to remember the forgotten but rather to remember the forgetting. While
involving a repetition similar to that found in situated presentation, remembering the
forgetting better preserves the irreducible singularity of presentation as such not through
a determining recollecting but through a reverberation of blankness: an indeterminate
echo.
This sentiment finds a point of resonance in a particularly well-known definition
of the sublime. Engaging in a play of mise-en-abyme, Longinus paraphrases—that is,
echoes—himself: “Well, elsewhere I have written something like this, ‘Sublimity is the
echo [apēchema] of a noble mind.’”52 Doubled and repeated, the “high” or event of
presentation happens over and over again, perpetuating itself. Yet this continual echoing
of hýpsous is not merely an empty gesture nor is it the repeated belatedness of situated
presentation. Rather, it signals the presence of something that resists situating and belated
comprehension. As Longinus himself writes, “For what is truly great bears repeated
consideration; it is difficult, nay, impossible, to resist its effect; and the memory of it is
stubborn and indelible.”53 An inerasable mark appears on those who strain towards the
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event of presentation while resisting any attempt at situating it. But this mark is beyond
decipherment: it is the mark of an enigma or the enigma as mark. While the forgotten
moment of presentation as such can never be retrieved, what is intimated in the echoing
and inerasable mark of the “high” is simply that there is forgetting, that forgetting
happens, that we forget. In spite of its simplicity, that forgetting happens and that we
remember that it does is beyond resolution, situating, comprehension. For this reason, the
intimation of forgetting echoes from previous phrases and will reverberate into the
phrases that come after it. The remembrance of forgetting will only carry on by leaving
an indelible mark: the mark of oblivion.
Because the remembrance of forgetting does not occult oblivion by situating it,
does not nullify oblivion but tries to hold onto oblivion and keep it close, it makes the
event of presentation as such appear as that which also always escapes the ability to
think: death. While remembering the forgotten is a locus of closure, a presentation to be
covered over, remembering the forgetting is a threatening openness, looming over us with
black wings. As Deguy notes, “Sublime words are words of the end.” Further he writes:
Sublimity at once belongs to the mortal curve and surmounts it, overhangs
it tangentially like a remarkable ‘turning point’, a pineal apex where the
body is united with and suspends itself in the soul, a utopia of infinitesimal
weightlessness as at the labile peak of the highest leap. Nothing remains
‘in the air,’ and the fall away from the sublime is fatal.54
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This seems to be the distinguishing movement of the “high.” Like the remembrance of
the forgotten, the only outcome in the remembrance of forgetting is defeat. There is no
presentation that is adequate to the occulting and occulted character of forgetting. As
such, the pedagogical valence of the treatise is once again thrown into considerable
doubt. Are there any lessons to be learned from impossible riddles, unfathomable notions
such as that there is forgetting?
“Death be not proud.” The impasse of forgetting nevertheless constitutes a
teaching, and because of this the impasse passes on: in a sense it passes away. The
presentation of forgetting, the testament to oblivion, precisely because it cannot be
solved, cannot be unraveled without a determination that must necessarily entail a wrong
and give rise to a differend, constitutes the inheritance of pedagogy; it is the lesson of
lessons. It is one of the echoes of the “high.” Returning to Deguy once more:
Under certain conditions, defeat with no tomorrow is not defeat. The
“ruinous” relation is reversed, something surmounts the “end” by making
it pass on and serve as a recommencement: a sublime point of time of
double value. The definitive becomes transmissible. The event requires a
witness. The addressee is the witness, and speech is the element in which
transmissibility can be transmitted. The witness hears, receives, entrusts to
language; he takes up speech “on the lips of the dying,” in order to
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promise to “realize” it. He will fail to “realize” it and will transmit in his
turn to the survivor the transmutation of his failure.55
There is a certain pessimism in this transmission of the failure, that our words are only
ever the words of the dead: sum quod eris, fui quod sis; I am what you will be, I have
been what you are. In the midst of the whispering echoes of death, however, there are
also echoes of promise.
This promise finds space within the failure that arrives in the presentation of
forgetting, in the “transmutation” that takes place from the delivery from one survivor to
the next, the “survivors” of the failure of presenting the occurrence itself. Charles E.
Scott, discussing the interplay between memory and forgetting, offers a productive
footing:
If I am right in finding in the fusions of horizons a mnemosynic moment
that irritates us as it makes questionable our methodologically based
certainties and truths, we arrive at a moment of strange rejuvenation, a
fragility that is in its own way a strength. This moment of fusion can give
rise to a sense that everything can be lost in a lethic instant, an instant that
gives return in loss, not in presence, an instant that turns us by Lethe to
Mnemosyne and to the arising—the igniting—of her Muses now in figures
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now in figurations of contemporary thinking, interpreting, and
imagining.56
In terms of Lyotard’s notion of presentation, the moment of presenting the forgetting, as
opposed to the forgotten, allows us to struggle for oblivion rather than struggle against it
in situating the presentation of the occurrence, and in so doing allows a continued and
varied production of thought, or new ‘figurations’ of the muses, to use Scott’s phrasing.
This spurring of new thought through the working of Lethe can be paralleled by
Lyotard’s thinking of parataxis. It is the conjunction and that allows the continual (and
necessary) passage from one phrase to the next, but it does more than that. The paratactic
component of the passage between phrases is also what allows “the vigil for an
occurrence, the anxiety and the joy of an unknown idiom.”57 Paratax, as opposed to
syntax, allows the possibility of phrasing without subordination or determination of what
precedes and what follows, and it intimates that not everything has been phrased, that
new phrases are always possible. And it is in this possibility, in conjunction with the
productive force of forgetting in memory, that allows for a certain solace in the expectant
(hopeful without hope) wait of a presentation that needs no succeeding phrase, no
situation.
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Chapter 2
I
In the sublime thought of Longinus, with its striving to bring the hic et nunc, or
here and now, of presentation as such before us through a phantasmal summoning of the
image, the element of pathos is relegated to a minor position. This changes with the
arrival of Kantian aesthetics and its appropriation and innovation of the sublime. Pleasure
and displeasure, disinterested sensations that must be held apart from those that arrive in
the mere satisfaction of the senses and the moral satisfaction of the good, are central
components in Kant’s third Critique, and yet they occupy something of a mysterious and
obscure place within the Kantian system of thought. These two affects are at the heart of
what Kant baptizes aesthetic judgment. As an instance in which “nothing at all in the
object is designated,”58 aesthetic judgment has a properly subjective character and
therefore finds itself fundamentally divorced from the processes of its sibling, that is,
cognitive or determinate judgments. While the latter type of judgment involves placing a
given intuition under a corresponding concept, adding to the edifice of knowledge, the
former judgment engages with a singular intuition where a concept is either lacking or
indeterminate. Because objective knowledge is not possible without a determined
concept, an aesthetic judgment does not tell us anything about the world properly
speaking.
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However, aesthetic judgment does tell us about ourselves in the very act of that
judgment. As Kant tells us, aesthetic judgments are the means “in which the subject feels
itself as it is affected by [a] representation.”59 What arrives in an aesthetic judgment is not
knowledge of the object but rather knowledge of the subject. More accurately, what is
accrued in aesthetic judgment is different from knowledge altogether. Because of its
emphasis on the insularity of pleasure and displeasure, Kantian aesthetics could be
described as an informal—that is, intimate—information that informs thought of itself. In
his study on Kant’s aesthetics, Jean-Franҫois Lyotard affirms this position, writing, “in
the analytic of taste, sensation no longer has any cognitive finality; it no longer gives any
information about an object but only about the ‘subject’ itself.”60 Rather than an aesthetic
judgment being about an object, it merely arises on the occasion of an object. In this
distance between the objective phenomenon and the subjective instance of judgment,
Lyotard locates one part of what he deems the “tautegorical” aspect of aesthetic
judgment: “any act of thinking is thus accompanied by a feeling that signals to thought its
‘state.’ But this state is nothing other than the feeling that signals it . . . a dazzling
immediacy and a perfect coincidence of what feels and what is felt.”61 Thought drags its
fingers along the contours of its own walls, smiling at the smoothness and wincing at the
roughness.
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Yet, what exactly is intimated on this occasion of thought feeling itself thinking in
aesthetic judgment? The answer, upon a first examination, is the presence of a unified
subject: the I think is reinforced through a simultaneous I feel. With the writing of the
third Critique, the unity of the Kantian subject becomes established, as the faculty of
judgment, according to Kant, provides the necessary bridge that spans the abyss between
reason’s theoretical and practical endeavors. This unity finds grounding in the particular
relation of the faculties of the mind found in the moment of reflective judgment. Writing
on the supposed universal communicability of aesthetic judgments, Kant notes: the
“determining ground of the judgment . . . can be nothing other than the state of mind that
is encountered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they
relate a given representation to cognition in general.”62 Here, in reflective judgment, the
relation between the faculties—a relation that characterizes “cognition in general”—is a
non-specific or indeterminate relation that stands in stark contrast to the typical
arrangement, in which one particular faculty holds a legislative position and determines
its bearing between itself and the other faculties of the mind. What occurs in the moment
of aesthetic judgment is that the faculties undergo a certain liberation, entering a state of
what Kant famously calls a “free play” of the faculties.63 The mind becomes full of stars
rather than constellations.
Engendering a feeling of pleasure for the thinking mind, the free arrangement of
the faculties in the judgment of the beautiful is a rare state. Nevertheless, the possibility
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of this state is always present and is presupposed by the ordinary legislating relations
between the faculties. According to Deleuze’s reading of Kant, if the faculties can enter
into determinate relations with one another, “it must follow that all together they are
capable of relationships which are free and unregulated, where each goes to its own limit
and nevertheless shows the possibility of some sort of harmony with the others.”64
Despite the fact that the faculties of the mind “differ in nature,” they are able to come
together in a harmony that preserves their heterogeneity, and this adhesive character of
the faculties is what “makes possible their exercise under the chairmanship of one of
them according to the a law of the interests of reason.”65 In this reading of Kant’s
aesthetics, the pleasure that comes in the free-play of the faculties in the judgment of the
beautiful is thought feeling the unifying and accordant relations of its own faculties. The
pleasure of the beautiful promises the bridge that crosses the abyss.
But this promise, for Lyotard, remains merely that: a promise. Echoing Deleuze’s
explication, Lyotard writes: “This finality [of the judgment of beauty] is subjective in that
it puts the components of the thinking of the beautiful, that is, of imagination and
understanding, together in such a way as to suggest their accord. Thus it is, I repeat, that
one ‘subject,’ a subject, that is, one is promised.”66 The unified thinking subject remains
merely a promise, however, because this promise is ultimately broken. And its breaking
finds its genesis in an aesthetic judgment that both complements and disturbs the

64

Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), xi.
65

Ibid, 69.

66

Lyotard, Lessons, 24.

40

judgment of beauty: namely, the judgment of the sublime. Lyotard elaborates on the
singular feeling of the sublime:
The procedure [of the sublime] reveals the degree to which the unity of the
faculties is precarious, lost almost—this is the component of anguish in
this feeling . . . Taste [the beautiful] promises everyone the happiness of
an accomplished subjective unity; the sublime speaks to a few of another
unity, much less complete, ruined in a sense, and more “noble.”67
While Lyotard’s commentary on the judgment of the sublime continues to speak
of a “unity,” it paradoxically links that unity to an incomplete and broken state.
What we find in Kant’s aesthetics, then, is a certain duplicity: the state of “free
play” and the accompanying pleasure engendered by judgments of the beautiful
are set in relief by the sensation produced by the judgment of the sublime. But the
sensation found at the heart of the sublime is not simply the opposite to that of the
beautiful. It is not displeasure. Rather, the sublime consists of what Kant calls a
“negative pleasure,”68 perhaps more accurately described as an oscillation
between pleasure and displeasure, a simultaneity of the two, or, paradoxically, a
pleasure through displeasure. Yet, if we recall that thought is informed of its own
state through sensation, a question arises: what is thought being informed of
regarding its state in the judgment of the sublime?
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The answer to this question is: the state of a differend. In the confrontation
between the faculties of the imagination and reason that occurs in the instance of the
sublime, according to Lyotard’s reading of Kant, a differend arises in reason’s call for the
presentation of that which cannot possibly be presented: the Idea of reason. As outlined
in the first Critique, Kant writes that reason strives “to seek somewhere for a resting
place in the regress from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned, which in
itself and as regards its mere concept is not indeed actually given, but which alone can
complete series of conditions carried out to their grounds.”69 In order to stave off the
infinite task of following causality or counting phenomena, reason produces such Ideas as
a “first cause” or “totality,” which cannot be verified empirically through our experience
in the world. As tokens of this striving for unity and completion, the imagination cannot
ignore the Ideas of reason and must present its own absolute, its maximum of
presentation, in order to measure up to these Ideas. Yet, these two absolutes are
irreducibly heterogeneous: they are incomparable.70
To understand this differend between the imagination and reason, we must return
to the object that occasioned the judgment of the sublime, to time, and ultimately to the
event of presentation as such. In the sublime thought of Kant, the judgment of the
sublime arises when we encounter a “formless object,” such as the rising Alps or a raging
sea, and the mind is confounded its inability to comprehend it in its entirety.71 In the face
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of this strange appearance, the imagination cannot circumscribe the intuition with its
schematizing operations, and the here and now of presentation as such threatens the mind
with its immediacy. Yet, it is this immediacy that calls forth the faculty of reason. As that
which is not given in reality through empirical phenomena, the Ideas of reason are
fundamentally futurally oriented. They are expected despite their impossibility. Turning
to the unity and consistency of knowledge provided by reason’s Ideas, it is “only a
projected unity, which one must regard not as given in itself, but only as a problem.”72
Likewise, the intrusion of the Idea onto the scene of aesthetic judgment procures only a
sense of our “vocation” or Bestimmung to exercise our reason to in its fullest capacity, a
call to us from a time beyond where we presently are. In the intimation of the event of
presentation as such, the Darstellung of the imagination is ruined, but the irreducible and
absolutely heterogeneous hic et nunc of the event appears as a fullness of time that can
stand in for the futural Ideas of reason so that reason can be satisfied here and now. This
is truly a passage of time, not the passage as flow but the passage as analogy. The future
comes as if it were in the present.
II
The as if of analogy, transmuting the fleeting and ephemeral hic et nunc of
presentation as such into the futural ever-to-be-actualized Ideas of reason, allows us to
see that the Kantian judgment of the sublime as a moment when reason can find reprieve
from itself but only by perpetuating the differend at the heart of presentation. Yet, the
instance of analogy is not alien to Kant’s system of thought nor is it merely idiosyncratic
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to the third Critique. While Kant keeps a critical eye on the tendency to slip into
transcendental illusion and attempts to maintain the separation of the sensible world of
phenomena from the supersensible world of noumena, he also undoes his own critical
practice by making jumps between the two using a carefully considered and partially
concealed manoeuver. The as if of the Kantian analogia, with its grounding in an avowed
proper proportionality,73 maintains the very demarcations that are being crossed; it keeps
everything in its proper place through an improper crossing of the border. Indeed, certain
problems arise in this analogical crossing, such as a potential need of a primordial “as if”
of a discernible distinction between the transcendental and empirical that allows Kant’s
own use of analogy74 or a Hegelian return of Nature to itself analogically through artistic
Genius.75 The analogy entailed in the sublime is merely one of many possible “passages”
from one domain of a faculty to another. What will become clear is that the Kantian
system of thought is as much about movement and crossing as it is about domiciling and
demarcating.
The tension that lies in the crossing of heterogeneous domains is what prompts
Lyotard to introduce his own analogy while unfolding his reading of Kant: the
Archipelago of the Faculties. In his idiosyncratic reading of Kant, Lyotard renders the
faculties of the mind into different “phrase families,” in which each faculty becomes a set
of rules for phrasing heterogeneous sets of objects or Vorstellungen. For example, the
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imagination would preside over ostensive phrases (“this is . . .”); the understanding would
preside over cognitive or descriptive phrases (“every effect has a cause”); and reason
would preside over non-verifiable phrases (“There is an unconditioned or first cause”).
Some phrase families are compatible with one another, such as those between the
imagination and the understanding (Every effect has a cause. Here is an example of such,
etc.), while others are incompatible, such as those between the imagination and reason
(There is an unconditioned cause. Here it is an example of such). While Lyotard’s
transformation of the Kantian faculties into phrase families is novel, what is of interest to
us here is how Lyotard conceives of their inter-relations. According to Lyotard,
Each phrase family would be like an island: the faculty of judgment would
be, at least in part, like an outfitter or an admiral who launches expeditions
from one island to another sent out to present to the one what they have
found (invented, in the old sense of the word) in the other, and which
might serve to the first one as an “as-if” intuition to validate it.76
These “expeditions” of judgment constitute what Lyotard calls “passages” between the
different faculties of the mind, the most problematic of these passages being those that
shuttle the faculty of reason, with its objectively unverifiable objects, and the other
faculties of the mind.
The prototypical example of the problematic intercourse with reason is provided
by the passage between the undeducible freedom of moral action and the laws of nature, a
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passage spanning the gulf between the sensible and supersensible realms. In Kant’s
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he argues that moral action cannot be
determined by a dogmatic set of arbitrary edicts but rather must be predicated on the
fictive universal value of the categorical imperative. According to Kant’s famous
formulation, a moral being is held “to do no action on any other maxim than one such
that it would be consistent with it to be a universal law, and hence to act only so that the
will could regard itself as at the same giving universal law through its maxim.”77 Because
the universality of the maxim of moral action cannot be verified, as it properly belongs to
the supersensible substrate, it can only be put forth indirectly for validation: that is,
according to analogy. Yet, this analogy is occulted by the phrasing of the maxim in its
employment of the “so that”—or so dass in the German original—of universality which
Lyotard argues should properly understood as an “as if.”
Similarly, the passage to and from reason can be in the realm of aesthetics—albeit
more explicitly—through Kant’s explication of the “symbol.” According to the third
Critique, the symbol is a species of Darstellung in which the imagination links onto the
concept of the understanding. Unlike normal cognition, however, in which the
imagination provides an intuition to be directly subsumed under the concept of the
understanding, symbolization only occurs indirectly.78 Kant gives us an example to
understand this mode of Darstellung: “Thus a monarchical state is represented by a body
with a soul if it is ruled in accordance with laws internal to the people, but by a mere
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machine (like a handmill) if it is ruled by a single will, but in both cases it is represented
only symbolically.”79 Through symbolization, the beautiful can become a symbol of the
good, and a transition from the realm of pleasure and displeasure to the realm of desire
can take place because the beautiful can call forth “sensations that contain something
analogical to the consciousness of a mental state produced by moral judgments.”80 Both
infiltrator and ambassador, the analogy of the “as if” is a passage between and through
spheres of heterogeneity.
However, Kant is careful to prevent any confusion in the indirect presentation of
the symbol. Returning to the example of symbolization provided above, Kant adds: “For
between a despotic state and a handmill there is, of course, no similarity, but there is one
between the rule for reflecting on both and causality.”81 The passage occurring in
symbolization is not one between objects, in the Kantian sense; it is rather a passage of
the “rule.” There is no coincidence of identity between an instance of the beautiful and
the morally good, but there is a similarity of reflection that is shared between them. As
Kant points out, both the beautiful and the good please immediately, are disinterested,
involve an instance of freedom, and finally both are declared universal.82 In Lyotard’s
reading:
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It is therefore, “symbolics,” not through a substitution of objects but
through the transferal and rotation of an intra-faculty mechanism: a group
of rules . . . is transferred, after being altered, from the pull of the feeling
of pleasure and pain to that of the faculty of desiring, without us ever
being able to speak of direct presentation.83
Sharing only in the rule of reflection, the instance of the beautiful does not allow us to see
the good in the phenomenal world. Instead, “taste as it were makes possible the transition
from sensible charm to the habitual moral interest without too violent a leap.”84 The
transition from the beautiful to the good is a passage, a passing of the threshold, as if one
were returning to a homestead.
How, then, should we characterize the analogical passage between the seemingly
empty and vacuous hic et nunc of presentation as such offered by the Darstellung of
imagination and the yearning to be present Ideas of reason in the judgment of the
sublime? Does it also belong to the mode of analogy known as the symbol? The answer
to this question is decidedly no. As Kant stresses, there is a sort of natural affinity
between the good and the beautiful in the common rule of reflection that can be found
between them. However, when transferred to the aesthetic judgment of the sublime, this
affinity finds itself disrupted. In the judgment of the sublime the imagination is not free in
the way that is found in the judgment of the beautiful; there is no “free play” of the
faculties here. Instead, the imagination is constrained by reason to present something that
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can measure up to its Ideas. Yet, neither is it merely a simple operation of attempted
subsumption. Reason wants its Ideas to be actualized—to appear in the phenomenal
world—so that it may come to rest in its unifying project, and so engages in a passage
that can bring this desire to completion: the passage of exchange. In this passage, the
undecidable here and now of presentation as such comes to be displaced by the Idea of
reason, as if they could be exchanged. And in this exchange, the imagination accrues an
unpayable debt.
III
Exchange, an essential component of what Lyotard in The Differend calls the
economic genre of discourse, is a twining and untwining of two parties, their
simultaneous coming together and dissolution. But not only does exchange require two
parties, it also requires two reciprocally formulated actions or—to use Lyotard’s
lexicon—two phrases: twin instances of giving and receiving. As Lyotard writes in The
Differend:
Phrase 1: (addressor) x cedes to (addressee) y referent a, this (ostensible)
thing. Phrase 2: (addressor) y cedes to (addressee) x referent b, that
(ostensible) thing. The economic genre: the cession of that thing ought to
annul the cession of this thing. Phrases 1 and 2 are linked together with a
view (the stakes or finality of the genre) to “freeing” the two parties, to
unbinding them.85
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The first phrase introduces a tension of reciprocation that the second phrase comes to
loosen, not as an expectation but as a presupposition, and this double phrasing constitutes
the minimal unit of action within the economic genre. For instance, when one offers a
token in exchange for another token, the offering only happens on the condition that the
reciprocal offering will happen simultaneously or immediately after. If the second action
does not happen, for whatever reason, then the two parties are locked together either in an
unresolved asymmetrical exchange, otherwise known as debt, or they continue the play of
giving and receiving until the expected outcome has been achieved.
In a similar, albeit modified way, the faculties of the imagination and reason enter
into this binding stricture of the double phrase of exchange, as if an exchange were taking
place. When the imagination provides a Darstellung of that which is either formless or
resistless, what is really happening is that it provides a Darstellung that intimates the
event of presentation as such, that there is such a thing as the unpresentable in the
phenomenal world. In this seeming impossibility, there is much more than a simple
indeterminacy of concept, such as that found within the instance of the beautiful, and as a
result this Darstellung is taken up by reason rather than the understanding. Because of its
radical heterogeneity, the hic et nunc of presentation as such—its moment of
happening—is mistaken as a fullness or repleteness, and reason seizes the opportunity to
insert its futural Ideas, its phenomena-to-be. It offers up its Idea in the expectation that
the imagination can fulfill the exchange seemingly made possible by its intimation of the
event of presentation as such. Only through acting as if this exchange is possible can this
temporal displacement between the future and the present—or now—occur and can
reason come to rest from its organizing and unifying compulsion.
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In the exchange between these two faculties, however, there is an irremediable
disparity between the cession and counter-cession or, stated differently, between the offer
and the expected fulfillment that will “unbind” the two faculties: the objects to be
exchanged are completely asymmetrical. The instance of Darstellung on the part of the
imagination, merely an intimation of the event of presentation as such, can only be
derived from the realm of the sensible and therefore can never equal the Idea that reason
offers in the judgment of the sublime. In other words, it is a problem of evaluation, a
problem that Lyotard takes up in terms of labor time and its exchange in The Differend:
“How do you know that y’s debt to x is acquitted when he cedes b against the a he or she
received? When a and b are of the same value?”86 As a “problem of idiolects,”87 the
judgment of the sublime is firmly within the domain of a problematic asymmetrical
exchange as an equivalency must be made between the futural Ideas of reason and the
incomplete now of presentation as such. But, as Rodolphe Gasché notes in his study on
Kantian aesthetics, there is never a complete arresting to the progress of thought. At the
very least, thought waits: it bides its time, allows time to stock up.
In the economic genre in which the exchange between the imagination and reason
takes place, time holds a privileged place. While time is not of import during the
production (so to speak) of the Ideas of reason and the Darstellung of the imagination, it
is important regarding the delay of their deployment, that is, the moment of their
exchange. Lyotard elaborates:
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Production takes time and this time is subtracted from the exchange. Time
accumulates during production, it is stocked up in products, up until these
are presented for exchange. The qualifications of a seller of services are
measured in terms of the amount of training time. The same goes for
determining the price of a commodity. The mere fact that it remains in
stock raises the cost.88
As the Darstellung of the imagination with its merely partial nowness of presentation
cannot be rendered satisfactory to the Idea of reason, the Idea of reason remains “in
stock” in the mind, forever waiting to be rendered applicable to the sensible realm,
accumulating more and more time that awaits to be nullified through the completion of
exchange. This failure of exchange is felt as displeasurable to thought. Yet, as Kant
stresses, this moment of displeasure in the asymmetrical exchange is only a transitory
one: “the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers and the immediately
following and all the more powerful outpouring of them.”89 The exchange does, indeed,
happen, but only if the imagination takes on a debt to reason. It is for this reason that the
pleasure of the judgment of the sublime provides pleasure only negatively;90 it happens
only through a failure of the imagination. Furthermore, the passage of exchange is how
reason justifies the subreption in the judgment of the sublime—that is, how it comes to
regard itself and its Ideas as sublime rather than the object that the imagination is trying
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to present. By operating as if this impossible exchange were possible, reason produces
enough satisfaction and pleasure to stave off its unstoppable predilection for unity.
However, there is another possible encounter between the event of presentation
and the Ideas of reason, a method of payment for the imagination to complete the
exchange with reason without procuring a debt. One encounters this secondary element
of exchange in relation to the sublime in a text that, at first glance, appears to have little
to do with aesthetics at all, Kant’s Contest of the Faculties. Using the term “faculties” in
a sense very different from the three Critiques, Kant there attempts to explicate the
relationship between hierarchically separated domains or institutions of knowledge: what
he calls the higher faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine; and the lower faculty of
Philosophy. In the course of this endeavor, Kant comes to the question of whether we can
know for certain if the human race is improving; this is “not a history of the past,
however, but a history of future times, i.e. a predictive history.”91 As Lyotard stresses,
because this part of history belongs to a set of events yet to come, there can be no direct
Darstellung of future events;92 they belong to a totality of a series that cannot be
presented within the phenomenal world. Yet, Kant is adamant that “in human affairs,
there must be some experience or other which, as an event which has actually occurred,
might suggest that man has the quality or power of being the cause and . . . the author of
his own improvement.”93 Emerging from the happenings of world history, this event can
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present us with an instance of historical progress; Kant baptizes this event a
Geschichtszeichen, a “historical sign.”94
This “historical sign,” bringing together the power of presentation on the side of
the imagination and the Ideas of reason, strongly resembles the judgment of the sublime
as outlined in the third Critique. For Kant, the example par excellence of the “historical
sign” is the French Revolution, but what connects this event to the sublime is not any
historical figure or specific phenomenal event of the Revolution. Rather,
we are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals
itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking place:
for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy . . . which
borders almost on enthusiasm, although the very utterance of this
sympathy was fraught with danger. It cannot therefore have been caused
by anything other than a moral disposition within the human race.95
The judgment of the spectators, as they apprehend the unfolding of the revolution, signals
that the passage did indeed take place between the imagination and reason, that a sublime
sentiment indeed is taking place.
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However, we must take care in how this instance of judgment is characterized by
Kant.96 Lyotard, latching onto Kant’s use of the term “enthusiasm,” a sentiment discussed
under the category of the sublime in the third Critique,97 is perhaps too quick in
characterizing this judgment as one that engenders the same negative pleasure associated
with the sublime discussed above, the negative pleasure of the asymmetrical exchange
between reason and the imagination. Moreover, in describing the event of the historical
sign, Kant reserves for it a merely undetermined indexical function, a “rough indication”
of human progression that cannot truly provide objective evidence for the Idea of reason
in the same way that the sublime of the third Critique calls forth our vocation to use the
full capacities of reason itself. But it must be noted that the instance of judgment
regarding the French Revolution is only “almost” an instance of enthusiasm, perhaps
indicating a certain haste on the part of Lyotard, and Kant himself introduces an
enigmatic and ambiguous aspect of the historical sign that undermines its supposedly
indexical function and opens a space for another interpretation.
In explaining the function of the historical sign, Kant gives us an obscure
definition of the “historical sign”: as a “signum rememorativum, demonstrativum,
prognostikon.” 98 With this new dimension, a certain fullness or repleteness suffuses the
instance of the historical sign, pushing it past both its indexical function and Kant’s
denomination of it as a mere “sign.” Rather, the historical sign is temporally saturated,
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encompassing past, present, and future in its confirmation of the Idea of reason in the
progression of humankind. 99 Whatever is presented by the imagination in this instance of
the Darstellung, whatever is exchanged with the Idea of reason, appears to be not a
failure of Darstellung but something akin to its apotheosis: approaching the presentation
of presentation as such, the event of presentation. Supplementing its activity of
Darstellung, the offering of the imagination in the occurrence of the historical sign is able
to complete the transaction between the imagination and reason, discharge the futural
time accumulating in the Ideas of reason through the overflow of the nunc of presentation
as such, and thereby “use up” reasons Ideas, use up their unifying force and let them
crumble in their age. If the judgment of the sublime in its negative pleasure and
asymmetrical exchange is the “passage of the impasse,” as Lyotard phrases it, then the
passage between the imagination and reason in the historical sign is the secret passage,
the forbidden passage.
What is added to the Darstellung of the imagination to open this passage and
discharge the demand of reason, is nothing other than the faculty of presentation itself:
namely, the faculty of the imagination. It presents and presents itself in its falling, its
failing, its burning. With this additional offer of the presentation of itself in its moment of
Darstellung, the faculty of imagination presents something akin to the Aesthetic Idea of
the third Critque: “that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking
though without it being possible for any determinate thought. . . . which, consequently, no
language fully attains or can make intelligible. – One readily sees that it is the counterpart
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(pendant) of an idea of reason.”100 Creating something like an Aesthetic Idea of this kind,
the imagination comes to touch upon, in the lightest of caresses, the domain of reason.
Yet, the fullness of this event of presentation as such is only secured by the selfpresentation of imagination’s own ruined image, the wearing of a death mask before one
dies. Therefore a displeasure remains. It resonates beneath the pleasure of a reason
satisfied. Yet, the feeling of displeasure in the sublime thought of Kantian aesthetics is
what illuminates another exchange and a debt as old as reason itself.
IV
As the imagination attempts to present its self-immolation, the moment of
presentation as such, in the demand of reason, to pay reason its due, the true tragedy is
unveiled as the exchange is completed and the tension of cession and counter-cession is
annulled: the Idea of reason itself is an empty token, it is only the whisper of a promise.
Our vocation is pro-voked. It is called before us, but it has not yet arrived. We are not yet
at our destination as completely moral and rational beings, a destination which resides not
in the present moment but in the future. Yet, at this moment in which reason can only
promise the future, it also reveals that it is itself in a debtor’s prison: it owes its imperial
demand to a primordial or original debt. Yet, this is a debt that it tries to forget or to
cover over, in order to display its infinite surplus to distract from its bankruptcy. This
move comes about through a play of optics, an artifice of perspective. It arrives in a
certain orientation of thought.
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The debt of reason is elucidated in a relatively minor text by Kant, titled “What is
Orientation in Thinking?,” written to defend his friend Mendelssohn’s assertion that the
existence of God can be objective knowledge. In order to guide this endeavor, Kant
employs the concept of “orientation.” Guiding one’s self according to the cardinal points
of the compass, Kant notes, requires more than mere objective knowledge about one’s
empirical situation or milieu: “For this purpose [of orienting one’s self geographically] I
must necessarily be able to feel a difference within my own subject, namely that between
my right and left hands. I call this a feeling because these two sides display no perceptible
difference as far as external intuition is concerned.”101 To be able to guide one’s self
using concepts of objective knowledge, according to Kant, one must first begin with an
almost primordial “feeling” within one’s self, one that is subjective. Further, Kant writes:
“thus, in spite of all the objective data in the sky, I orientate myself geographically purely
by means of a subjective distinction.”102 The individual being navigates the relation
between a subjective interior and an objective exterior through a subjectively felt—rather
than objectively known—grounding. Moreover, Kant takes this notion of spatial
orientation and extends it into the domain of thought itself.
In encountering an Idea with no possible sensible intuition or phenomenon, such
as absolute totality or the unconditioned, the mind must orient itself properly towards this
Idea in order to prevent itself from being completely arrested or incapacitated. In an
encounter of this type, Kant writes, “[the mind] will then no longer be in a position, in
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determining its own faculty of judgment, to subsume its judgments under a specific
maxim with the help of objective criteria of knowledge, but only the help of a subjective
distinction.”103 Again, we encounter this obscure notion of a “subjective distinction.”
However, Kant is judicious in how he develops this notion of orientation regarding the
Ideas of reason. One does not merely use subjective feeling to support any unknown or
unknowable Idea. Kant writes: “if this judgment is made necessary by a real need . . . we
require a maxim in the light of which this judgment can be passed; for reason sooner or
later must be satisfied.”104 It is the condition of “a felt need”105 that enables the use of
orientation within thought and allows thought to accept an Idea of reason which is
without sensible support.
The “real need” that permits thought to orient itself according to its Ideas owes its
satisfaction to a feeling, is indebted to a feeling that itself produces.106 The feeling that
thought feels in view of its deficiency can only be a certain anguish, a desperate desire for
“satisfaction.” In other words, it must be a feeling of displeasure that reflects reason’s
weakness in itself, perhaps an unbearable weakness. It is precisely at this moment that the
demand of reason comes into being: facing a representation of the mind that will cause
this anguish to return, something must be done. Kant writes, the “right of the need of
reason supervenes as a subjective ground for presupposing and accepting something
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which reason cannot presume to know on objective grounds, and hence for orienting
ourselves in thought.”107 Thought transmutes the feeling of a need into a justification for
a seemingly unimpeachable right and effectively places reason within a state of exception
among the faculties of the mind. It is after this first orientation through a feeling of need
that one can establish a “rational belief”108 in successive orientations, and reason can
continue its production of, and interest in, its supersensible Ideas: the mind continues to
do its work, its ergon.
But what of its parergon, its frame, its initial orientation through only a feeling or
subjective distinction? It appears that the orientation of thought follows almost exactly
the logic of the parergon outlined by Jacques Derrida in his essay of the same name in
The Truth in Painting. As Derrida writes, “a parergon comes against, beside, and in
addition to the ergon, the work done, the fact, the work, but it does not fall to one side, it
touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside.”109 The subjective
orientation of thought as frame, then, accompanies the imperial demand of reason—and
its supersensible Ideas—as that which exists alongside it but is veiled or covered by the
majesty of reason itself. Derrida continues: “the parergon is a form which has as its
traditional determination not that it stands out but that it disappears, buries itself, effaces
itself, melts away at the moment it deploys its greatest energy.”110 Likewise, the primal
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orientation of thought by a subjective feeling is effaced in the exact moment that it allows
reason to issue an absolute demand of the absolute based on a subjective feeling of a
need. The orientation of thought, then, is not only regulated to the position of a mere
frame or lens but is also forgotten to be a lens in the first place.
It is as a memento of sorts that the sublime intervenes. It does so not exactly by
providing a new orientation in which the mind can frame itself but by suspending, even if
just for a moment, any framing gesture of an orientation through a re-visitation to the
moment of reason’s debt to feeling. Elaborating on the “negative presentation” of the
Kantian sublime, Nancy writes:
[Negative presentation] does not constitute a replication, even a negative
replication, of this operation [of presentation]. It does not constitute an
infinite figure or image but the movement of a cutting, delineation, and
seizure . . . It is the unlimited beginning of the delimitation of a form and,
consequently, of the state of a form and of the form of a state.111
It is the vibratory movement of the sublime, the oscillation between pain and pleasure,
which makes us aware of the sublime in its “unlimited beginning” exactly by bringing us
back to the moment of displeasure in reason’s inadequacy. Particularly interesting for us
here is how the sublime informs the “form of a state”: could this be the form of our state,
the orienting form of thought? Always starting from the first time, always for the first
time, the sublime brings us to a new beginning but never moves past it, for this beginning
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is unlimited. When viewed in terms of thought itself, this movement of an ever-renewed
beginning constitutes a suspension: a suspension without orientation. In the unlimited
raising and demolishing [un enlèvement]112 of the limit, the advent of the sublime and its
contradictory admixture of feeling takes the orientation unifying the state of reason and
brings it back to the beginning, back to its debt to feeling, as if we could start all over
again.
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Chapter 3
I
The sublime of Jean-François Lyotard, shaped by its debt to Kant and its neglect
of Longinus, is also critically aware of its own genealogy and the refrains of thought
repeated in that very lineage. In working out (or, perhaps, working through) his own
approach to the sublime, Lyotard identifies how the “unpresentable” event of the sublime
can be subject to different clinamina or inclinations of presentation: the modern and the
postmodern. The former is bound to a certain melancholy or nostalgia that “allows the
unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents” while “the form, because
of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the reader or viewer matter for
solace and pleasure.”113 In its modern guise, the aesthetic of the sublime is duplicitous in
that the attempt to present the unpresentable is subverted by determining operations of
placement, location, or identification, such as the simulated hic of Longinian phantasmal
presentation or the artificial nunc of Kantian temporally displaced moment of
exchange.114 “Programmed by generic rules,” the sublime “loses its character as event
and becomes recitation.”115 In this way, the modern aesthetic of the sublime and its
nostalgic pleasure via formal recognition effaces the affect of displeasure proper to the
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heterogeneity of the sublime event and could therefore be seen as more akin to the
Kantian judgment of the beautiful.
The latter clinamen of presenting the sublime, baptized by Lyotard as
postmodern, takes a different trajectory, however. Rather than presenting the
unpresentable using the gilded idols of familiar forms and categories,
the postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of
good forms, the consensus of taste which would make it possible to share
collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new
presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger
sense of the unpresentable.116
What makes Lyotard’s postmodern sublime radical is precisely its movement to
problematize the radix, to uproot its forms and put forth the “unpresentable in
presentation itself.” In the absence of any recognizable form of the here and now, the hic
et nunc of Longinus and Kant respectively, there appears to be no stable footing from
which to approach the advent of the sublime event, and this estrangement from
familiarity is where one experiences the specific admixture of pleasure and displeasure,
borrowed from the Kantian sublime, that is so important to Lyotard’s own conception.
Rather than making displeasure merely a means towards pleasure that ultimately effaces
its anterior moment, as in Kant, Lyotard`s sublime instead holds the two together
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simultaneously in a taut simultaneity: displeasure in the realization that something
remains to be thought or phrased but cannot yet be; and pleasure in the realization that
thought is not finished, that one can discover (and not learn) how to think differently. To
merely learn how to think differently would entail a repetition or recitation of the alreadythought through established rules and formulae; to discover how to think would signal
that one is truly in the province of the unpresentable.
As the wellspring of displeasure in the aesthetic movement of the sublime, the
unpresentable can be neither a verifiable object of a descriptive phrase (the unpresentable
has the properties of x or y) nor an immutable referent in an ostensive phrase (this is the
unpresentable). As discussed above in relation to the differend, what is properly
unpresentable is presentation as such, the singular and heterogeneous happening of any
given.117 As a result, we run into a certain paradox in Lyotard’s injunction to weld the
unpresentable to presentation itself for the unpresentable and presentation are seemingly
co-incidental with one another. It is perhaps in the face of this paradox and lack of
procedure to unravel it that Lyotard resorts to a paradox of another sort while intimating
the quest of the postmodern artist: “Those rules and categories [of judgment] are what the
work of art itself is looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules
in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done . . . the paradox of the future
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(post) anterior (modo).”118 Producing a tension between the future and the past, the “will
have” of the future anterior can simulate the temporal moment of the present, the now.
However, this suspension between the future and the past in the present moment would
only be illusory, a fact of which Lyotard is all too aware. The now always escapes “the
intention to identify, the project of seizing and identifying an ‘entity’ that would, ‘here
and now,’ be the thing itself.”119 Instead, we must read Lyotard’s mobilization of the
future anterior as preserving a certain fidelity to the indeterminacy of the sublime event.
In working in the mode of the future anterior, the “will have been done,” in discovering
rules that will only be rules in retrospect, the postmodern artist or thinker comes closest
to approximating the feeling of the hic et nunc by merely testifying to the
unpresentability of the event, that here is in fact something left to be presented.
Yet, in theorizing the sublime, in writing about it, in testifying to the feeling that
something cannot quite be put into words or rendered appropriate for cognitive
consumption, Lyotard himself is attempting to link onto the unpresentable in a manner
akin to those artists he engages with. As Gérald Sfez rightly points out, Lyotard engages
in a style of writing that “is at once both the effacement of style in the philosophical and a
philosophical style,”120 employing dialogic, elliptical, and fragmented styles (to name a
few) throughout his oeuvre. But Lyotard is not merely an artist but also a philosopher,
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and if the sublime event calls for a shedding of consolatory forms or categories, what
mode of linking testifies to the differend at the heart of the unpresentable, the
unphrasability of the hic et nunc, in the genre of philosophical discourse? The first step in
answering this question lies in the distinction Lyotard mobilizes between the quid and the
quod. Writing on the painting of Barnett Newman, Lyotard notes: “if, then, there is any
‘subject-matter’, it is immediacy. It happens here and now. What [quid] happens comes
later. The beginning is that there is . . . [quod]; the world; what there is.”121 Barnett
Newman’s painting, according to Lyotard, provokes a state of thought in which any
attempt to determine its significance or meaning, the what of the painting, is arrested or
inhibited. But this is not to say that the painting is a complete emptiness or vacant of
meaning for the viewer; the individual is still affected by the occurrence of the painting,
feels the that there is something left to be said or expressed. Continuing his engagement
with the work of Barnett Newman, Lyotard writes: “It is at the very least a sign, the
question-mark itself, the way in which it happens is withheld and announced: Is it
happening? The mark of the question is ‘now’, now like the feeling that nothing might
happen: the nothingness now.”122 The question is it happening? should not be mistaken
for an explication of Newman’s work; rather, it is Lyotard’s closest engagement with the
unpresentable in philosophical discourse. Neither a determinate object nor a determinate
tense can be extracted from the phrase due to the presence of a question mark, which
subverts any attempt at certainty. When we encounter it either in Lyotard’s writing or this
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very page, there is always a moment of hesitation: a certain displeasure at its obstinacy; a
certain pleasure at realizing that we are not yet finished thinking. Through its testimony
that (quod) there is some indeterminacy, even in philosophical discourse, Lyotard’s
question is it happening? provokes the missed event of presentation as such similarly to
the abstract art of Newman and for this reason appears to me as Lyotard’s greatest
contribution to the theory of the sublime.
At the risk of tautology, the question of the sublime, then, becomes the question
of the sublime: Is it happening? The feeling of the sublime, evoked by the perceived
unpresentability of presentation itself, is attested to within thinking, philosophy writ
large, in the form of an interrogative. As an indeterminate question, thinking can open
itself to the sublime event without prejudging, identifying, or speaking on behalf of what
cannot be phrased. Only in this mode of thinking, philosophy’s own form of the future
anterior―that is, thinking without a prescribed or normative rule―can one attempt to
“save the honor of thinking”123 in the face of the differend of presentation. But the
interrogative, itself, holds a privileged place within the genre of philosophical discourse.
As a potential function for determination, the interrogative is often an opening salvo for
judgment. Moreover, the interrogative often bears within itself the force of obligation.
Lyotard’s interrogative may inadvertently continue the effacement of the differend in the
face of the unpresentable. Is one obliged to answer the question is it happening?
II
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Is it happening? It is a seemingly simple question yet also one that is steeped in
obscurity. Is Lyotard’s question an open invitation (“try to guess, if you like”)? Or does it
carry a force of obligation, demanding a participation in a theatrical enactment of a call
and answer (“You ought to tell me what is happening”)? As an instance of the
interrogative that only presents an indeterminate hic et nunc, the question is it
happening? signals that it is precisely the here and now that is missing and the here and
now is what must be searched for. Only by eschewing the pretenses to absolute presence
can one authentically attempt to present the instance of presentation itself and testify to
the differend of presentation. And if Lyotard’s phrasing of the interrogative does indeed
belong to those attempts akin to postmodern artists to present that there is an
unpresentable, namely presentation as such, then it is a question that is inextricably
bound to the pursuit of an ethical orientation, laboring under the colossal weight of
obligation.
In his writing on the painting of Barnett Newman, Lyotard maintains that
Newman’s artistic endeavor attempts to instill a sense of obligation through the
provocation of the feeling of the sublime. Lyotard writes: “The message is the
presentation, but it presents nothing; it is, that is, presence. This pragmatic organization is
much closer to an ethics than to any aesthetics or poetics. Newman is concerned with
giving colour, line or rhythm the force of obligation within a face-to-face relationship, in
the second person . . .”124 Drawing on Levinas’s ethics in relation to the face of the Other,
Lyotard situates the work of Newman within an attempt to express the absolute alterity of
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presentation itself. But while the “message” of the painting is presentation, this message
and why it “presents nothing,” properly speaking, cannot be delivered: the occurrence of
presentation can only be known negatively as what is never present. Yet, as the moment
of presentation recedes, the feeling of the sublime remains, and from this feeling comes
both the intimation of presentation’s alterity and its accompanying ethical call for
expression. Similarly, Lyotard’s interrogative, is it happening?, engages in this same
movement and therefore comes to accrue an ethical valence.
However, it is not only that Lyotard’s philosophical phrase participates in art’s
ethical relation to presentation; art also participates in the interrogative movement shared
by Lyotard’s philosophical phrase. In light of this, we come to see a certain co-incidence
between the activity of thinking and the activity of artistic creation. Regarding the
former, Lyotard writes: “the question of how to make others understand what thinking is
is the question of the intellectual. The philosopher asks only: ‘What is thinking?’”125 In
another essay, Lyotard takes up a similar line of thought regarding artists, noting that
“painters or writers (or musicians, etc.) have to reply to the question: ‘What is it to
write?’, ‘What is it to paint?’”126 The tasks of these two endeavours, then, are
complementary to each other: one poses the question (the task of the philosopher) while
the other gives a response to a question (the task of the artist). It would be a mistake to
see these two activities as completely separate endeavors; rather, one should see them as
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two components or stages of the same adventure: to recognize that indeterminacy exists
and to present that very indeterminacy. In other words, to present the unpresentable.
What makes Lyotard’s interrogative, Is it happening?, particularly remarkable is that it
seemingly combines the two endeavours into one phrase belonging to the philosophical
genre of discourse. Not only does the question orientate one towards the problem of
presentation as such, but it also testifies to that problem by provoking the feeling of the
sublime and thereby affectively signaling that there is indeed something unpresentable.
Things become more complicated when we come to interrogate Lyotard’s
interrogation and begin to measure the distance between the work of postmodern artists
and the work of Lyotard’s philosophical discourse. As Lyotard stresses, the fact that one
must, out of necessity, react to the differend of presentation is a given, but how one reacts
to the differend (or links on to it, to use the lexicon of Lyotard’s The Differend) is not:
“One can strive to determine this something by setting up a system, a theory, a
programme or a project – and indeed one has to, all the while anticipating that something.
One can also enquire about the remainder, and allow the indeterminate to appear as a
question-mark.”127 What must be remembered is that Lyotard’s interrogative is merely an
attempt to link onto the sublime feeling provoked by the differend of presence as such
and the attempt to testify to that differend by likewise instilling that feeling of
disappointment at defeated thought and jubilation at its never-finished task. Where the
tension arises is in the distance between the Lyotard’s “enquiry” and the “appearance” of
the sublime as a “question-mark.” As Lyotard phrases it above, the interrogative is it
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happening? seems to derive from the event of presentation, itself appearing in the form of
a question. But this is somewhat inconsistent: the occurrence of presentation would be
enquiring about its own occurrence, as an uncertainty of being as its being. Yet, in
another essay, the unpresentable, dubbed matter, “does not question the mind, it has no
need of it, it exists, or rather insists, it sists ‘before’ questioning and answer, ‘outside’
them.”128 One must, then, strive to maintain the distance between the event of
presentation’s differend and the interrogative of is it happening?, for they are separate
things. However, Lyotard seems to conflate the two.
This movement to combine the event of presentation with the enquiry regarding it
engenders the illusion that the moment of presentation is indeed before us, that the event
of presentation is calling us to answer for its occurrence as a question. Far from being a
simple mistake, however, the conflation of the occurrence of presentation and the
interrogative that links onto it does more than merely mislead us. As Rodolphe Gasché
notes: “Understood as events, phrases ‘do’ things. They have actual effects as well as side
effects, and inadvertent effects, and therefore trigger other responses, other events that
may clash with the initial phrase events.”129 Lyotard’s interrogative, along with its
illusion of a presence of presentation as such, provides a temptation in the phrase’s very
form as interrogative in that it entails an undeniable answerability: it welcomes answers,
encompasses them, validates them. The pretension of securing the hic et nunc of
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presentation as such, entangled in both the sublime of Longinus and the sublime of Kant,
is seemingly evaded in Lyotard’s idiosyncratic formulation, but the hic et nunc, now
encountered as question, can then undergo something akin to an intellectual
waterboarding. As a potential testimony to the differend of presentation within
philosophical discourse and driven by the obligation invoked by its proximity to the
alterity of presentation as such, the interrogative Is it happening? can easily give way to
the terror of interrogation.
III
The interrogation that unfolds from the interrogative is it happening? is not a
complete perversion or deviation from the event of the sublime. After all, interrogation
has a strong connection to terror: from at least the Inquisition to the crossing of borders in
our contemporary moment, the posing of the question has had an unsettling relationship
with the disturbing affects of anxiety and fear. And terror, in turn, has an intimate relation
to the event of the sublime, the very event that prompts the linkage of Lyotard’s is it
happening? Edmund Burke, a near contemporary of Kant, provides us with this
mobilization of terror regarding the aesthetic event of sublime. In a famous and oftquoted passage, Burke writes: “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain,
and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible
objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime.”130 As that
which threatens us with annihilation, the terrible is what secures the feeling as properly
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sublime. Yet it must be remarked that Burke’s sublime, like that of Kant and Lyotard, is
characterized by the admixture of both pleasure and displeasure, and for this reason that
which instills terror must be held at “certain distances” and with “certain
modifications”131 so that a pleasure can issue from the encounter with the event. We will
soon see that these “distances” and “modifications” enable the slipping from the
interrogative as testimony to the interrogation of the moment of the event itself.
Despite his (somewhat ambivalent) discipleship to Kant concerning the sublime,
Lyotard does allow himself moments of theoretical infidelity, and in some instances he
turns to Burke while developing his own theory of the sublime. In particular, Lyotard
notes that “[Kant] strips Burke’s aesthetic of what I consider to be its major stake – to
show that the event of the sublime is kindled by the threat of nothing further
happening.”132 This aspect of the event of the sublime, entailing the “threat of nothing
further happening,” is what Burke identifies as the source of the displeasure in the
sublime, the feeling that he baptizes as “terror.” Lyotard subsequently frames this feeling
in terms of privation: “Terrors are linked to privation: privation of light, terror of
darkness; privation of others, terror of solitude; privation of language, terror of silence;
privation of objects, terror of emptiness; privation of life, terror of death. What is
terrifying is that the It happens that does not happen, that it stops happening.”133 This
feeling of displeasure in Lyotard’s sublime, the feeling of terror, seems at odds with the
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feeling of displeasure that characterizes the situation of the differend in the event of
presentation, namely the displeasure of encountering that which demands to be phrased
but cannot yet be. The strangeness of the sublime event in its terribleness, because of its
radical unfamiliarity, makes the it is happening of presentation appear as a suspension of
happening, a privation of being through an intimation of not-being, an intimation of the
end. While the displeasure of the differend signals a state of indeterminacy and
heterogeneity, the displeasure of terror signals rather the state of absolute cessation: the
nullification of both homogeneity and heterogeneity, determinacy and indeterminacy.
Yet, the two are in fact co-incidental; they are merely two sides of the same
moment. The radical heterogeneity of the event intimated in the feeling of displeasure in
the sublime only appears, for a moment, as the end. Unexpectedly meeting that which it
is unprepared for, albeit negatively, thought is arrested, and despite the limited duration
of this moment, an intimation of thought’s end is comprehended. But, as Lyotard notes in
The Differend, there is no cessation to thought and phrasing in general, and so thought
continues as it necessarily must, for even silence is an instance of phrasing. This tension
between contingency (being able not to be) and necessity (not being able not to be)
allows the moment of transition from pure terror to a terror that is tempered into a sense
of obligation to find new idioms to phrase that which cannot yet be phrased, the moment
of presentation itself. Lyotard, himself, is aware of how terror functions in this regard:
Burke wrote that for this terror to mingle with pleasure and with it to
produce the feeling of the sublime, it is also necessary that the terrorcausing threat be suspended, kept at bay, held back. This suspense, this
lessening of a threat or a danger, provokes a kind of pleasure that is
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certainly not that of a positive satisfaction, but is, rather, that of relief.
This is still a privation, but it is a privation at one remove; the soul is
deprived of the threat of being deprived of light, language, life.134
The secondary privation that Lyotard speaks of, the privation of privation, comes in how
one links onto the event of presentation intimated in the feeling of displeasure within the
aesthetic of the sublime, how one testifies to this heterogeneous event with their own
attempt (if at all), and how the terror is held at a “certain distance” and with “certain
modifications,” to return to Burke’s formulation.
If Lyotard’s phrasing of Is it happening? within the philosophical genre of
discourse serves both as a testament to the heterogeneity of the event and an instigation to
search for new idioms to phrase this event, then it only gives us a precarious example.
The interrogative calls forth a response, and any response is a response to the
undetermined something of the phrase. Yet, a response does not necessarily entail a
determination and is able to retain the heterogeneous character of the event of
presentation. Nevertheless, there is an impulse in the interrogative to introduce its own
idiomatic “distances” and “modifications” to the moment of terror that comes in the
encounter with the event of presentation. Drawing on the work of Emile Benveniste,
Catherine Belsey presents the notion of an “interrogative text,” one which both questions
any sense of a unified subject position and refuses to accept any single perspective.135 But
the interrogative text also “invite[s] the reader to produce answers to the questions it
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implicitly or explicitly raises” and “invites an answer or answers to the question it
poses.”136 If Lyotard’s interrogative phrase, Is it happening?, can be considered along
these same lines, then his testament to the differend of presentation itself invites a
continued renewal of the very wrong that the sublime feeling signals through its
invitation of determination.
Likewise Lyotard’s interrogative could produce a cascading of interrogatives in
its wake (What is happening? What does it mean? Why does it matter?). At first glance,
this may not seem like an entirely detrimental activity: The ever-unfolding of questions
seemingly skirts determination and the circumscription of heterogeneity. Mirroring the
“infinity of plastic essays to be made”137 by art and its goal to present presentation as
such, to testify to its impossible presence, Lyotard’s interrogative could be an instance of
philosophy’s infinity of interrogative essays to be made in its attempt to do the same
within its domain. But, despite this possibility within the interrogative form, Lyotard
remains ambivalent regarding the posing of the question in general. Lyotard writes: “It is
the destiny or destination of the mind to question (as I have just done). And to question is
to establish the relation of something with something.”138 The interrogative Is it
happening?, then, in addition to acting as a possible testament to the unpresentable event
of presentation as such, the it is happening, can also be part of an operation which
disavows the unpresentable through its very interrogation.
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Yet, the phrase regime of the interrogative is not amenable to interrogation in and
of itself. Rather Lyotard’s phrase owes it imperial force to the genre of discourse in
which it belongs, one which strives towards the validation of cognition: the philosophical
genre. Returning to The Differend and its discussion of obligation, Lyotard notes:
“Obligation would take place only at the level of genres, which prescribe stakes: you
ought to link on like this in order to get that. For example, if your discourse ought to be
philosophical, then you ought to link on with a view to finding the rule for the discourse
(and then, you ought to pay attention to the Is it happening?).”139 The obligation carried
by the interrogative, then, becomes an interrogation when the genre of philosophical
discourse impels the linking of further questions or further answers in order to find the
rules for the judgment concerning the is it happening? Writing on Lyotard, Rodolphe
Gasché notes: “The discursive genre of cognition, which is largely responsible for
shaping philosophical thought, is intrinsically skeptical of the ‘Does it happen?’—the
Arrive-t-il?’—and thus is bound to produce differends.”140 The very phrasing of the
interrogative Is it happening? occurs in the genre of discourse that seemingly cannot fully
accept it, and the hic et nunc of presentation as such remains within the realm of the
differend even as it is testified to within the philosophical genre: “Attested, suffering, and
the untamable are as if already destroyed. I mean that in witnessing, one also
exterminates. The witness is a traitor.”141
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IV
Despite the weight of the telos of the philosophical genre of discourse, with its
continuous endeavour to find the rule that will govern its meandering voyage, the
tendency for Lyotard’s interrogative Is it happening? to transform into the terror of
interrogation is not ensured. It is not a necessity that the interrogative bears an
unimpeachable obligation that one “ought to answer” or that one “ought to clarify” the
question in other terms. What must be stressed, at least one more time, is only that one
must link or phrase, not that one must link in a particular way. In the face of a telos
belonging to any genre of discourse, a deviation or a swerve is always possible. But if
this is the case, how else can one link onto Lyotard’s interrogative testament to the
unpresentable character of presentation as such without determining the hic et nunc of
presentation, and therefore wronging its proper heterogeneity, through the process of
questioning and answering? A possible breach in the determining aspect of the
interrogative can perhaps be found through a linking, or phrasing, that may at first seem
very distant from the genre of philosophical discourse and its quest for questioning: the
fable. While Lyotard himself never makes a concrete connection between the
interrogative Is it happening? and what could be called the genre of fabulative discourse,
the manner of linking that this discourse allows to Lyotard’s testament to the event of
presentation gives us an alternative to the determining aspect of interrogation, enacting a
movement from interrogation to interregnum.
Yet, in order to stave off the force of interrogation in the interrogative and more
adequately testify to the here and now of the event of presentation, the genre of the fable
must be one that is hospitable, a good host to the fleeting guest of the event, of
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presentation as such. For this reason, fable must be held at a distance from another notion
mobilized by Lyotard throughout his oeuvre: namely, narrative. Used extensively in The
Postmodern Condition, narrative functions as a method of legitimating forms of
knowledge and practice through enabling a certain reiterability and repetition that
reinforce what could be considered a “good competence.”142 Narrative makes a return in
The Differend as a genre of discourse itself, one that is problematic in relation to states of
the differend. As Lyotard notes, “Narrative is perhaps the genre of discourse within
which the heterogeneity of phrase regimens, and even the heterogeneity of genres of
discourse, have the easiest time passing unnoticed.”143 While this aspect of narrative may
appear congruous with the heterogeneity of presentation as such, allowing the event of
presentation to come to the fore, it is rather the opposite. “Narratives drive the event back
to the border”144 and subvert the moment of tension of the differend and its admixture of
pain and pleasure by making them merely moments of a progressing story rather than
moments to be lingered over. Neither, however, should the fable be confused with a mere
example of myth. Akin to narrative in that it carries an “identificatory force,” myth
differs from narrative by approaching the differend directly, “appropriating what is
absolutely improper,”145 and rendering the differend into a type of sigil. Myth occults the
differend by hiding it in plain sight.
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Emerging from an act of reflective thinking, the linking between the interrogative
and the fable, in contradistinction to narrative and myth, offers us an example of the only
kind of thinking that according to Lyotard, can attempt to do justice to the differend. If
we recall Lyotard’s statements above, we see that reflective thinking is being attuned to
the temporality of the future anterior, the what will have been, and as a result the fable is
not a moment of re-telling or re-counting a previously given set of coordinates or
paradigmatic rules. Just as Dylan Sawyer, in his study on the relation between literature
and the differend, reserves a distance between literature and narrative in general, with its
tendency to “re-inscribe” and “re-tell,”146 through the literature’s capability to introduce a
certain innovation or newness into its relation to the differend, one must hold a similar
distance between fable and narrative. While Sawyer’s conception of literature perhaps
undermines itself through an over-reliance on remembrance and recalling the moment of
the differend itself, fable as it should be understood here reaches towards no anterior
moment: it has no memory, properly speaking. In their writing on art, Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari explicitly distinguish between acts of memory and acts of fabulation:
Memory plays a small part in art (even and especially in Proust). It is true
that every work of art is a monument, but here the monument is not
something commemorating a past, it is a bloc of present sensations that
owe their preservation only to themselves and that provide the event with
the compound that celebrates it. The monument’s action is not memory
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but fabulation. We write not with childhood memories but through blocs
of childhood that are the becoming-child of the present.147
Fabulation, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is part of a process that separates the
actual perceptions and affections involved in a given work, both on the part of the artist
and art viewer, from its authentic being. “The work of art is a being of sensation and
nothing else: it exists in itself.”148 In an act of fabulation, memory must be eschewed so
that sensation can become a “monument,” properly speaking.
While Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of fabulation differs from Lyotard’s notion
of the fable in that Lyotard maintains an interest in those who encounter states of the
differend and its admixture of affective states, both strains of thinking reject the role of
memory in both fabulation’s construction and its apprehension. It is this fact that imbues
Lyotard’s notion of the fable with a certain autonomy akin to the in itself and of itself of
the artwork in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of art, despite the aforementioned
emphasis on the aesthetic spectator. The autonomous character of Lyotardian fable is a
result of its belonging to what he deems the mode of “realism.” Unlike conventional
understandings of the term “realism,” Lyotard takes an idiosyncratic approach, noting:
“Realism is the art of making reality, of knowing reality, and knowing how to make
reality.”149 Realism, then, is not to be understood as mere representation or mirrored
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reflection but as something akin to poeisis or a making. More precisely, the fable is a
radically indeterminate form of poeisis. Lyotard continues: “In the fable, linguistic
energy is expended for imagining. It therefore does fabricate a reality, that of the story it
tells, but this reality is left in suspense with regard to its cognitive and technical use. It is
exploited reflexively, that is, referred back to language in order to link onto its topic.”150
Neither an answer to the question of is it happening? nor a mode of the Bildungsroman,
the fable engages in a reflexive activity that is counter to any “cognitive and technical
use” The fable as interregnum only links onto the interrogative obliquely, tentatively,
only with phantom lines. “A fable is exposed neither to argumentation nor to
falsification. It is not even a critical discourse, but merely imaginary. This is how it
exploits the space of determination the system keeps open for hypothetical thought.”151
Yet, if the fable is reflexive it is because it is also reflective in the Kantian sense;
more than merely a moralistic tale, the fable takes on a unique valence among the
various, infinite genres of discourse through the affect that it engenders. “With no
cognitive or ethico-political pretension, the fable grants itself a poetic or aesthetic status.
It has worth only by its faithfulness to the postmodern affection, melancholia. It recounts
its motive, first of all. By the same token, every fable is melancholic, since it supplements
reality.”152 As the start to the fable concerning presentation as such, Lyotard’s
interrogative Is it happening? adds another (there will always be at least one more)
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attempt to testify that there is, indeed, an unpresentable. Yet, as Lyotard makes us aware,
this can only be done by adding on to reality as it is presented and thus only ever missing
the moment of total integration and presentation. Moreover, Lyotard expresses what to
him resolves in the resonating affective chord of the event: from the discordant
displeasure of knowing that something escapes thought, to the pleasurable recognition
that there is something left to say, we slowly come to the realization that it will never
enough, that we will never be enough. Is this the moment to resign or to save the honor of
thinking?
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Conclusion
Melencolia I—Rather than a feeling idiosyncratic to the fable, perhaps the feeling
of melancholy suffuses all three sites of sublime thought regarding the event of
presentation as such. Each moment of thought discussed above constitutes a jubilant
failure regarding the event of presentation. In the rhetorical treatise of Longinus, the
phantasmal image of thought that returns the event of presentation before our eyes is
tempered by an echoing refrain intimating the impossibility of this return. In the
transcendental aesthetic of Kant, the futural Idea of reason exchanged with the irreducible
event of the here and now, as if they were comparable, is undermined by a return to the
past debt of reason and its subsequent re-orientation. Lastly, the interrogative Is it
happening?―with its problematic relations to interrogation, terror, and obligation—
disrupts itself by becoming the beginning of a para-epistemic instant of phrasing: the
fable. In our inability to untangle the aporetic knot of the hic et nunc once and for all,
what remains in these moments of sublime thought is a resignation that one can merely
testify that there is something that escapes thought. Like Albrecht Dürer’s brooding
angel, with its tools, instruments, and methods seemingly rendered useless and its visage
turned away from the light of hope, our thought is arrested, and nothing can give us
consolation, let alone deliver us from the labyrinthine puzzle of presentation.
Knight, Death and the Devil—Yet, as has been stressed throughout this thesis,
there is no cessation of phrasing and therefore no cessation of thought. Must we then
forge ahead, leaving behind sublime thought and its aporetic presentation of presentation
as such? Jean-Luc Nancy, in the preface to a collection of essays on the subject of the
sublime, writes:
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The sublime properly constitutes our tradition . . . What it passes on to us
in the name of the sublime is not an aesthetics. It is above all not an
aesthetics of the grandiose, the monumental, or the ecstatic, with which
the sublime is often confused—admittedly not without certain historical
reasons, which must be handled with discretion, even as this all-too-heavy
word sublime must perhaps gradually be effaced.153
While Nancy is reminding us of the overburdened state of the word sublime itself, there is
also the sense that he is intimating that the sublime and its modality of presentation will
be overcome or surmounted; it will be “effaced.” For Nancy, the question of the sublime
is above all the question of “sensible presentation,” one which will “put into
communication or contact all instances of presentation (for example, history, community,
sense, politics, thought, and even representation, which is itself also one of these
instances).”154 The presentation that accompanies the sublime, as elaborated by Nancy, is
seemingly a mere means towards an end, one that opens the way to a general
investigation of presentation. Like Dürer’s Knight—flanked by the Devil and Death—
who nevertheless marches forward armored, mounted, and with a steadfast gaze, we
move onto other moments of thought with the enigma of presentation as such in tow.
Saint Jerome in His Study—But it is not enough to carry a burden yet pay it no
mind, to merely endure unthinkingly a task that is set before us. This is not the path of
responsible thought. Returning to the opening of this thesis, I remind us that thinking the
differend, that which escapes thought itself, constitutes the properly ethical dimension of
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philosophy, and for this reason, the thought of the sublime remains integral to this
project. Designating not only the event of presentation as such, sublime thought names
the site where thought both responsibly faces that which confounds it at every turn and
ensures that we never forget that this unthought happens. The sublime, the attempt to
think presentation as such, is not a cross to bear but a pendant around our neck. In the
third Critique, Kant calls the Aesthetic Idea the “counterpart” [das Pendant] to the Idea of
reason,155 and in a similar way, the ruined thought of presentation as such is the
counterpart to our occulting and forgetful mode of everyday thinking. “Being prepared to
receive what thought is not prepared to think is what deserves the name of thinking.”156
Like Dürer’s saint, engrossed in his studies, whose glance towards the cross on the table
would necessarily also take in the skull on the nearby windowsill, we must keep our
mysteries, our enigmas, our pendant thoughts close at hand so that they can, if not guide
us, at least remind us that there is something that as of yet remains unthought.
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